Thank you for avoiding the confusion, as I got scared.
I don't think the formation is very bad, though. But the execution isn't very consistent. It improved before the international break, so for that alone I'd be willing to wait a bit for them to "get warmed up" again. But overall I'm not entirely sold on the execution and durability of the tactic.
When the team is close to 50-60%, maybe even 40-60%, it generally stands a good chance, but any below turns into too much pressure on the back 3 to 7, while anything over 60% puts too much emphasis on lacking elements of this squad in this setup.
The tactic seems to try to overwhelm the opposition with a lot of players at once, while having a decent cover for counters against aided by the midfielders and wingbacks running back, but as a sort of back-and-forth game with a slight possesion-dominance or a relatively comfortable counter based situation, it seems pretty potent, but even if i.e. the City goals were moments of mental absence/mistakes, it does seem tactically prone to any mistake made with no Plan B ready (enough) to cover for any mistake. Perhaps City is a bad example, especially when Haaland and the passers are in good form, but I'm not sure if the signs are there that it was just mistakes vs good side being fatal, instead of a tactical deficiency. But with the current state of United it might be okay to consider the team not ready for survival against the strongest oppositions.
Which is okay. But when you're against the bus parkers, it becomes a little too apparent that it's relatively safe to let United try to figure out how to get past or around it, and you notice that the formation doesn't allow for that much creative variance. Players like Bruno, Amad, Cunha, Mount, Mbeumo, possibly Dorgu, Zirkzee, Mainoo when in form, can individually create something, but when only one, maybe even two, are in some kind of form, I don't know if it's enough to fall back on besides maybe a lucky break or mistake from the opposition (+ the sharpness to punish it like Haaland did)
Some games it does look really good and since the uprise only just began to show how it looks when it does in fact "tick", so to consider it a lost cause rather than something needing (different) tweaks and adjustments, is a little premature, I think, but I hope it get addressed to a degree that it's not just crying whenever Cunha or something isn't able to join, or that moving Amad out of RWB makes most of your 'plan' impossible. Of course level of the player, especially the level they match your tactics, matters, but I think it would be naive, imo.
Sometimes naive is a positive stubbornness, and it's lead various managers to (often initially surprising) great successes, but that doesn't mean it always leads to success in the same way and under every single type of circumstance. Sometimes I'm surprised how club cultures and even the managers (or others involved) switch the success of a creative solution that came from a specific change to the exact shape of that particular solution, rather than the creative and adaptive of it all.
Like how Ajax became (to the fanbase) the 4-3-3 club and that being the only way to succeed with possession-based football, instead of total football with creative or technically well rounded players. I think ETH is a little better at adapting than Amorim, but they are both a bit attracting danger with their respective ways of stubborn decisions and behaviours. Both of them succeeded with sticking to a philosophy or analysis of current football demands and their squads' assets.
Did Amorim even begin at Sporting with this formation? Because the way he decided on it, could be the "way" to go, instead of just blindly aiming for the "it" (just exaggerating to clarify, as he does make adjustments to his tactics now and then). ETH had multiple set ups at Ajax, all 4-3-3 on paper, but rather something like 4-2-1-3 and 3-4-3 in practice, both tactics that were shaky and had ETH be deemed "past it" or "overrated" until they overpowered various sides without it being lucky overperformances against strong sides from the best leagues.
I think he started out that way at United, too, similarly in his second season, but I think him sending back Reguilon was a big example of his approach-shift around that time. He had a tactic seemingly built on his best XI, and workarounds to create something between that best plan and the make-do plan B to make it at least okay until the players improved/adapted/returned/were replaced, but Reguilon was sent back because Malacia and Shaw were deemed almost ready by the medical staff. We all know how that ended. So many players out injured, players who didn't end up joining, and other plans either just didn't come to fruition at all. But from then on ETH just kinda stuck to that tactic that really only worked a few times when they brought other teams down to chaos with them, to beat them with experience, and that was obviously inconsistent. In his interviews you noticed the shifts as well, he was always a bit weird and direct, but now it was a bit more volatile, and a lot less cute or charming.
Start of this season we heard that shift in tone from Amorim as well, so the better run of form later might be just in time for him to at least believe in himself and the squad, but it also shows the cracks are there and could show a vulnerability to it all. And one thing that is worse than an overly stubborn manager (or player, or anyone really) is an overly stubborn manager that doesn't really believe in what he's stubborn about. So while he stays, I hope he does at least believe in what he preaches, especially if he's willing to defend it with his life.
Perhaps the 5 at the back could be less of an issue if an Amad-less wings approach doesn't leave those positions with the same importance. Maybe start out with someone like Mainoo (or Mount?) instead of Casemiro, or just change players' responsibilities and priorities when circumstances, availabilities, oppositions and their weak spots change.
Eventually Mount got on for Maz and Amad moved to the right, while Mainoo replaced Casemiro later, too, but with Zirkzee and Mainoo with so little minutes in their legs, it's kind of naive to expect such a change to have a definitive success, even if you expect less from them than you generally do Sesko/Cunha and Casemiro/Bruno/Mount. And that is without even diving deeper into how substitutes are a great tool, but a changing of tactics asks quite a lot of adaptions that goes beyond just the players who came on. In that sense even the Maguire for Yoro sub we saw earlier was one of the better ones, as this shift is one most of the (starting) players know, so they also know more easilty what this change generally asks of them.
Mount for Amad was sensical beforehand as Mount as an option made a lot of sense due to his personal flexibility, but if Amad started on the right and Mount in L10, the formation's major change would be Zirkzee for Sesko. Both for Zirkzee, Amad, and everybody who is used to some interplays developed during the season, I think their times would have been better. Now they started kinda 5-2-3 and moved to 3-4-3 or 3-4-1-2 (or kinda 4-4-2/4-3-3ish) in the second half. With the amount of subs, and some missing elements that are usually a part of earlier similar adaptations like this, I think it isn't that weird that a lot of people looked worse than just a few weeks ago.
I think it could be good to have the option of the wingbacks being actual wingbacks/offensive fullbacks vs wide midfielders/extra wingers with more stamina-demands, there, and it should be useful to have a type of security option there, but then the team should be able to adapt beyond just those particular wingbacks of the day adapting to the responsibilities of a wingback vs fullback or winger or 10, etc. But I think the changes for the Everton game were a bit too many than what seemed before, and it's not really surprising it looked worse.
It was way worse than that even, and I'm not trying to defend anyone, but I think this might have been Amorim falling for the trap he laid for himself and sees the core of his tactic being putting people in the positions he wrote down for his 3-4-2-1 formation, without (fully?) realizing that placing Mazraoui there instead of Amad, and then put Amad there again, means the creation of two different positions in practice. Even at his most offensive, Mazraoui vs Amad in the same place would be like a RWB or RMF (if simplifying the small but significant change to highlight through exaggeration again), instead of just having two different options for the same position. The option is great, but we've seen that the practice really isn't there (yet). If it makes the comparison easier, it's the same when replacing Mbeumo with Mount. Sure, it could work, but if you ask them to replicate the other's main tasks and think it's a faster version with a better finish vs a better passer who turns more easily (idk), you know you missed the fact that one will be more of a midfielder and one more of a forward.
Zirkzee could be a clear misfit or not good enough or anything, but it's too easy to single him out and forget the fact that you also need to work around the actual possibilities. He is a different type of player, let alone striker, than Sesko, but his best games is when other players were close to him and he isn't an isolated forward. He can hold up and when warmed up his passes are pretty good, too, but especially when he's got 1-2 options, etc. Especially when he hasn't played much, why make it even harder to use his best assets and skills than would have been the case if all he had to do was replace Sesko (and even both Sesko and Cunha)? Why make things harder for yourself and your players, all to have Mount on the bench and preserve your precious little formation (on paper)?
Again, I get the decision, but I think in this case keeping the option of Mount on the bench wasn't a good one, as it meant even more changes to the whole team's approach than just replacing the ones out injured. Think even starting Mainoo (or Bruno) at 10 would have been the better choice here if you wanted Mount's flexibility for the second half. I also understand Mazraoui covers Dorgu better when they want to shift to a 4 at the back as they often do when one of the wingbacks is higher up the pitch, but it really was a bit overly optimistic to have a (practically) 5-2-2-1 on the field when to of your starting forwards are out for the game. He really could have done more to make his lesser (talented or in-form doesn't even matter) players look better than what happened this weekend.
Hindsight is easier, and analysis isn't objective here, so I do think it's important to not bash and judge Amorim or even his ideas here, but,
[TLDR] While 5 (or 3) at the back is totally fine as at least an option, the stubbornness of Amorim could really break him if all he's willing to defend is the set up on paper and not the problem-solving in game. Hope this game helps to at least realize some of the players' and overall squad's vulnerabilities, and to better gauge how changes to the XI affect the players beyond the literal individual replacements and their respective independent forms.
