I think weakness would be ending the war with a perception Russia didn't gain anything from it. If the US says Crimea is part of Russia, that would be gaining something.
That said, I think Putin is so entrenched in Donbas that he wouldn't agree to giving any of it back, although he may be willing to barter with the parts of Zap and Kherson he presently holds.
Agreed. To be fair, from a realpolitik perspective, this may be the best possible, and only feasible, outcome at this point.
From Putin’s viewpoint:
1) Suppose the US would not only recognize Crimea as part of Russia, but it could get quite a bit, if not all of Western Europe, and some of rest of the world to recognize it. That would mean, in the future, and conflict did break out, it would very hard for countries to back a Ukrainian invasion if Crimea. it would “right one of the historical wrongs” that Putin desires. It would also mean funding or aiding insurgencies in Crimea would be a big no-no and highly risky for the West.
2) Of course Putin’s not going to give up all of the advances in the Donbas. But he may negotiate on some of them. And there probably has to be demilitarized zones established.
3) He could get it in writing that Ukraine isn’t allowed to join NATO for x number of years, or even expanded it to say, Ukraine and some other nations (Belarus, etc, aren’t allowed to join NATO) for x number of years, or forever.
4) It’s an off-ramp with big wins and there is no guarantee he’ll ever get a US administration this favorable to him ever again. He may not even live to see it.
For the Ukrainians:
1) This will hurt, but let’s be clear, it is highly unlikely even if Europe gets their act together and Trump did a 180 and doubled or tripled own on military assistance they’ll be very unlikely to retake Donbas and Crimea.
2) Ukraine doesn’t have to recognize Crimea or any part of Donbas. And they won’t and shouldn’t. So it would be like Korea. Some countries recognize things, others don’t - but essentially it is what it is, as long as major hostilities don’t break out.
3) The Ukrainians will have to be extremely tactical and smart on negotiations on exact borders and lines. They should also push for a window of repatriation - meaning the Ukrainians in occupied territories can come across the lines and resettle into Ukraine, and get those kidnapped kids back. This could also favour Putin, he’ll just resettle the occupied lands with former Ukrainians who want to stay, and loyal Russians. Less future insurrectionists.
4) The Ukrainians will never agree to de-militarize.
That’s a non-starter. Will they be happy with EU guarantees or promises of aid for re-armament? Can they join the EU, even if barred from NATO?
5) The super-tricky part - what’s the backstop? What’s the punishment if Russia just decides to take a break and build up another massive invasion force? Well, first of all, there probably needs to be monitoring and the western intelligence will be well aware of Russian military buildups. Likewise, the Russians will have aware of Ukrainian buildups in the future. What’s most likely, in my opinion..
- The Ukrainians will want NATO-affiliated troops (French/British) based in Ukraine, even if they are not a member of NATO. Russia will object to this wholeheartedly as they’d just see this as “NATO bases in Ukraine”. I doubt this would happen unless it’s time-bound - for example, “Peacekeepers could be based in Ukraine for X number of years, but must be withdrawn by this date.”
- A non-NATO, but European led “coalition of the willing” could make a pact and have a ready response force to come to come to Ukraine’s aid if serious violations of the ceasefire. I.E. French, British, Italian (you make it up) and Polish forces based in Poland with a tripwire for Odesa, Kyiv, and Lviv. Meaning, any assault on key strategic areas far removed the front-lines and areas of possible skirmishes, but which indicate a major invasion triggers the “coalition of the willing” to act and deploy rapid- response forces and probably to enforce a no-fly zone. Difference is they can’t be based in Ukraine. The Russians will hate this, but you know what? They can’t do a lot about it, especially if those forces are based in NATO countries. At least it’s not Ukraine as a NATO country and WW3.
- There’s a strictly non-NATO peacekeeping force there. Can’t see Ukraine going for this. Having like UN peacekeepers from South Africa, Malaysia and India…(just for example). Tough to see Ukraine going for it, but it would be a deterrent. Sort of.
So, it really comes down to…
1) Will Putin take the off-ramp or not? The conditions with the U.S. and Europe may never be more favourable to him than now.
2) Will the Ukrainians take it? Can they fight on, for 4 more years, possibly without U.S. backing and hang on and hope it gets better in 4 years?
3) If you’re Putin, can you really take the rest of Ukraine, and then hold it?
4) If you’re Ukraine, can you really count on a few things… continued U.S. and/or EU backing, and something major to happen in Russia - total economic collapse, coup d’etat and complete reversal of policy, etc.?
5) Or, it just drags on and another 4 years of attritional warfare. Ukraine hoping for a change of U.S. politics and Europe strengthening themselves and Ukraine and being more embolden to face Russia with or without the U.S. Russia hoping the U.S. cuts all ties and the Europeans flounder, and the Ukrainian lines completely collapse and they can take the whole country.