Sudpect itd be the other way around. China produce in a highly cenrralised manner, in high density, target rich environments which are relatively easy to disable. The US can produce in small shops,sheds and garages all over the country. Thatd be an absolute nightmare to slow down. Similar story for logistics diversity.
Regardless,i dont evwr really see a conventional hot conflict with china as the adversary. They need each other too muxh.
I'd push back a little bit here on the optimism and the conclusion.
Yes the US has superb small-manufacturer depth, but the critical bottlenecks in modern weapons are not the sheds and the garages. The critical bottlenecks are a handful of highly specilized facilities that can produce things like solid rocket motors, advanced semiconductors and precision guidance components. Those are concentrated and some are genuinely singular, i.e. some components in key US weapons systems are effectively sourced from one or two suppliers globally. Losing even of those facilities would cripple production in ways that no amount of distributed light manufacturing can compensate for.
On the China interdependence point, this is the conventional wisdom and it's probably right
today, but it's worth noting that China has been deliberately reducing that mutual dependency since Trump 1.0 so roughly during the last decade. Their USD exposure is down, their domestic consumption is rising and they're been building alt trading relationships thru BRICS and Belt & Road. They're not fully decoupled from the US, but the assumption that economic interdependence makes conflict unthinkable is on a shakier footing each year.
The scenario that
@Carolina Red raises, a war of attrition in the ME where Chinese production feeds adversaries while US stockpiles drain, is more realistic than a direct conventional confrontation anyway. China can decide the outcome of a war without firing a single shot itself, simply by keeping the other side supplied.
Which rather brings the conversation full circle, back to the original cost-exchange problem that started this thread (
@dumbo and
@Sweet Square post) and it's worth spelling out just how lopsided that is. Think about it this way. Every time a defender shoots down a cheap drone with an expensive interceptor they're losing the economic battle even when they win the actual engagement. The attacker just needs to keep the factory running. An Iron Dome interceptor costs somewhere between $50k and $100k a shot. A Patriot is $3-4 million. A hypersonic interceptor can run over $10 million. The Shahed drones getting knocked out of the sky are maybe $20 to 50k each. The math is just brutal.
And we already saw this play out for real. Israel's defense against the Iranian barrage during the 12 day war was running somewhere around $1 to 1.5 billion per night. Per night. These systems were never built for that kind of problem. They were designed to stop nuclear warheads and precision guided missiles from peer states, not to swat away hundreds of cheap drones at maybe $500 a pop. That's a completely different threat and the old Cold War playbook has no good answer for it.
So if China is quietly sitting back and just keeping the other side's conveyor belt stocked, the numbers get really ugly really fast and nobody on our side of that equation has figured out a good answer yet.
Short of using nukes that is.