Geopolitics

[Water Melon]

They are 2S19 MSTAs

And Russia has hundreds of them. These are nasty feckers.

 

[Beans]

Much like the British in Ireland. That went well too.

Where did they send them, Australia? Or just southern Ireland? I should know more about all that seeing as I have Irish and English descent (and Welsh and Scottish).

 

[Frosty]

Where did they send them, Australia? Or just southern Ireland? I should know more about all that seeing as I have Irish and English descent (and Welsh and Scottish).

We deported loads to the Caribbean after the Civil War too.

 

[Buster15]

History has a habit of influencing the present. The 'legitimacy' of Britain's current control of the 6 counties hinges entirely on the fact that the Unionist community in that very carefully selected part of the island was and is (for now), larger than the Republican community. If it wasn't for English, and later British, governments manipulating the demographics of the area through forced displacement, oppression and discrimination against Irish people and settlement of British people, Northern Ireland would simply not exist as a political entity. At the same time, the reason Northern Ireland exists in its current form is because, in the peace treaty which ended the War of Independence, Britain decided where the lines would be drawn and did so to maximise the amount of territory it could maintain with the veneer of legitimacy granted by a majority Unionist population. Off the top of my head, only Counties Down, Antrim and maybe Derry had a majority Unionist population in 1922. If a vote had been done county-by-county, Northern Ireland could be a 3 county state. Regardless of your political bent and your views on the legitimacy of Northern Ireland generally, it's difficult to classify British control over Omagh, Fermanagh and Tyrone as anything other than a colonial landgrab.

The relevance of the above to Russia's annexation of Ukrainian over the last decade (and Russian action in Ukraine historically) is quite clear. I'm pretty sure the Russian majority in Crimea was created centuries ago by the forced displacement of the Crimean Tatars. In the present day, it's a playbook Putin has used and likely will use again to provide a paper-thin sliver of legitimacy to Russia's territorial expansion. Use force, or the threat thereof, to drive as many non-Russians as possible out of an area, move more Russians in, work out the biggest possible area where you can guarantee a 'loyal' majority and arrange a referendum in that area in which the majority you've created votes to transfer ownership of the land to Russia. Fix the referendum for good measure and start governing the territory despite the international outcry. As in Northern Ireland, and basically anywhere where a colonial power has forcibly settled against the wishes of the current inhabitants (America, for one), once there is a generation or two of 'loyal' Russian citizens born and bred in an area it suddenly becomes very difficult to argue that the land isn't theirs and they need to pack up and give it back.

That is very interesting and thank you for posting it.

 

[Mciahel Goodman]

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Source is Russian affiliated apparently but the content is the important part. The Solomon Islands' proposed security arrangement with China moves ahead, in spirit, despite backlash from its "Western" neighbours.

 

[Mciahel Goodman]

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[2cents]

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He’s so tiresome sometimes.

 

[Mciahel Goodman]

He’s so tiresome sometimes.

True, yet completely correct this time.

 

[Smores]

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Source is Russian affiliated apparently but the content is the important part. The Solomon Islands' proposed security arrangement with China moves ahead, in spirit, despite backlash from its "Western" neighbours.

Suddenly we're back to "regional security concerns" being valid discourse. We even had Australian media suggestion an invasion to prevent it

I'm sure it's right wing media as it always is but it's a line so many fall for. Our security alliances are valid and of no concern to anyone, your security alliances are an unacceptable threat. A double standard based on otherism and western hegemony being elite.

 

[2cents]

True, yet completely correct this time.

How so? If Ukraine has been offering these things, and yet the invasion has continued with the only thing stalling it being a combination of Russian incompetence and Ukrainian resistance, that actually suggests that there is indeed more to this action than Ukraine’s international alignment. Never mind that Mehdi’s simple mind doesn’t seem to have considered that, short of accepting its own dismemberment, neutrality is pretty much all Kiev has to offer at the table.

 

[Mciahel Goodman]

How so? If Ukraine has been offering these things, and yet the invasion has continued with the only thing stalling it being a combination of Russian incompetence and Ukrainian resistance, that actually suggests that there is indeed more to this action than Ukraine’s international alignment. Never mind that Mehdi’s simple mind doesn’t seem to have considered that, short of accepting its own dismemberment, neutrality is pretty much all Kiev has to offer at the table.

Ukraine wasn't offering these things before the invasion, is the point Medhi is making. And in terms of criticism, people started a movement to discredit anyone who raised these issues as potentially problematic and potentially key to resolving the situation before the outbreak of war. NATO was clearly a factor. The point you're making is that Ukraine offering these things should be enough to ensure peace. Russia did have other objectives. Demilitarization which Ukraine has pushed back on, rightly, and so they do have things to offer beside NATO and neutrality (Crimea and Donbas arrangements being two other key points).

 

[2cents]

Ukraine wasn't offering these things before the invasion, is the point Medhi is making.

I don't think that is the point he's making, but in any case, Zelensky was talking in mid-February about how NATO membership was not going to happen. And if NATO membership is as key to this as is often suggested, than Kiev's offers of the last month should have been enough to secure a ceasefire at the very least.

And in terms of criticism, people started a movement to discredit anyone who raised these issues as potentially problematic and potentially key to resolving the situation before the outbreak of war. NATO was clearly a factor.

People disagreeing on the internet is not a movement. And he's pushing a strawman by suggesting that "serious people" were claiming that this had nothing to do with NATO. All serious people accept that NATO membership is a factor to be considered, the debate is over its actual significance in the broader historic context of Russia's relations with the West and its own imperial history.

The point you're making is that Ukraine offering these things should be enough to ensure peace. Russia did have other objectives. Demilitarization which Ukraine has pushed back on, rightly, and so they do have things to offer beside NATO and neutrality (Crimea and Donbas arrangements being two other key points).

The offer of neutrality will only be enough to ensure peace if Moscow concludes that the cost of continuing to push for more is not worth it. Perhaps we'll reach that point shortly, but I have doubts. Ceding Crimea and Donbas equals accepting dismemberment, and demilitarization means removing the one obstacle to preventing further dismemberment. I'd assume they will only be offered if the tides of this war change in Moscow's favor, although an offer of autonomy for Crimea and Donbas seems a pain-free way to attempt to smooth the re-establishment of Ukrainian sovereignty in those regions (not that I expect Moscow to cede on Crimea). Yet if this war had gone as Moscow planned, we'd be far beyond discussion of these things, and possibly getting to grips with things like support for the government-in-exile or how to conduct relations with the Lviv puppet-regime.

 

[Mciahel Goodman]

People disagreeing on the internet is not a movement. And he's pushing a strawman by suggesting that "serious people" were claiming that this had nothing to do with NATO. All serious people accept that NATO membership is a factor to be considered, the debate is over its actual significance in the broader historic context of Russia's relations with the West and its own imperial history.

It absolutely is when refracted through broadcast and print media as part of an overall state strategy, which is/was the case. Check the demonization of Mearsheimer (very real) and revisionism regarding those same "serious" people who spoke on the topic for decades. These were scholars. He is talking about state aligned broadcast outlets, which is a different group of "serious" people.

I don't think that is the point he's making, but in any case, Zelensky was talking in mid-February about how NATO membership was not going to happen. And if NATO membership is as key to this as is often suggested, than Kiev's offers of the last month should have been enough to secure a ceasefire at the very least.

There had been a build-up of NATO military hardware and assets in Ukraine for eight years. It was a de facto NATO state, or becoming one. Or, Ukraine was not in NATO but NATO was definitely in Ukraine.

Yet if this war had gone as Moscow planned, we'd be far beyond discussion of these things, and possibly getting to grips with things like support for the government-in-exile or how to conduct relations with the Lviv puppet-regime.

Yeah I agree with this part.

 

[Pintu]

I’ve already posted the context you gave yourself in your post of that massive, highly questionable article, explicitly talking about Russian propaganda. I also posted a post from a different thread, referenced in this one, where you explicitly stated that western propaganda is better than Russian or Chinese propaganda.

Western propaganda is definitely smarter since it doesn't market itself in the same way. It comes in many different and subtle ways. Independent investigative journalism, documentaries, or even movies.

I personally believe most of our Propaganda is good, it is often the only way to push forward just and rightous ideals. People do not change their minds easily.

This is one strange example of propaganda, I can think of. In this case, history teaching certainly plays a role as well.

In 1945, most French people thought that the Soviet Union deserved the most credit for Nazi Germany's defeat in World War II — even though the Soviets didn't play much of a role in France's liberation, relative to the US and Britain. By 1995 and 2004, however, the French had changed their minds, and were crediting the US as the biggest contributor to victory in Europe:

But it is still a very open society. And regimes like Putin's can use that to their advantage. This recent poll shows that too many in France (52%) adhere to some of the Russian propaganda about the War, despite the Western media's relentless work to discredit the Russian narrative. And despite the censorship of RT and its affiliates.

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"28% believe that the Russian intervention is supported by Russian-speaking Ukrainians wishing to free themselves from the persecutions they suffer"

This doesn't mean that these 28 % support the invasion, but they seem to believe that Russian-speaking Ukrainians do.

 

[do.ob]

True, yet completely correct this time.

So if the Ukrainians offer the Russians to rename some streets with Bandera's name, will you post a tweet laughing at the people stating that de-nazification wasn't a primary war goal?

 

[hasanejaz88]

So if the Ukrainians offer the Russians to rename some streets with Bandera's name, will you post a tweet laughing at the people stating that de-nazification wasn't a primary war goal?

I don't think anyone realistically believed that Ukraine has a nazification problem or that it was the reason for Russia invading. It's in no way similar to the discussion of NATO expansion being a cause.

 

[do.ob]

I don't think anyone realistically believed that Ukraine has a nazification problem or that it was the reason for Russia invading. It's in no way similar to the discussion of NATO expansion being a cause.

It is when you try to break a complex issue down to some stupid "gotcha" tweet.

 

[Carolina Red]

Western propaganda is definitely smarter since it doesn't market itself in the same way.

You may be right… I wasn’t arguing one way or the other about propaganda in that post, I was just trying to get Mcihael to clear up what he was arguing.

 

[Mciahel Goodman]

So if the Ukrainians offer the Russians to rename some streets with Bandera's name, will you post a tweet laughing at the people stating that de-nazification wasn't a primary war goal?

It isn't a "gotcha". It's to highlight how/why it (briefly) became heterodox to speak in factual terms. The people briefing against NATO being a factor knew it was a factor as Obama and other administrations, and senate/house committees under those administrations, have openly spoken about it (McFaul is a good example, but there were scores of such talking heads pushing the same narrative). The move was to narrow the topic down to "democracy versus autocracy" which is also a legitimate issue but dissenting views which were previously orthodox were maligned. That's not something that should happen.

You may be right… I wasn’t arguing one way or the other about propaganda in that post, I was just trying to get Mcihael to clear up what he was arguing.

Yeah I didn't make myself very clear either but Pintu and others have done a better job of getting to what I meant than I did (Nimic and Frosty too iirc).

Edit: As for good/necessary propaganda, public health discourse is a good example of a necessary sphere for state propaganda. But I actually think they've become so slick in their PR campaigns that even the good causes/initiatives suffer from overproduction/oversaturation and association with political campaigns that were in bad faith, leading to mass distrust (and batshit things like QANON). Another tangent, though.

 

[do.ob]

It isn't a "gotcha". It's to highlight how/why it (briefly) became heterodox to speak in factual terms. The people briefing against NATO being a factor knew it was a factor as Obama and other administrations, and senate/house committees under those administrations, have openly spoken about it (McFaul is a good example, but there were scores of such talking heads pushing the same narrative). The move was to narrow the topic down to "democracy versus autocracy" which is also a legitimate issue but dissenting views which were previously orthodox were maligned. That's not something that should happen.

That must be why his careful analysis of the situation mentions he was smeared and is owed an apology.

 

[Mciahel Goodman]

That must be why his careful analysis of the situation mentions he was smeared and is owed an apology.

Probably. I don't know about his personal motives but the topic is legitimate.

 

[oneniltothearsenal]

It absolutely is when refracted through broadcast and print media as part of an overall state strategy, which is/was the case. Check the demonization of Mearsheimer (very real) and revisionism regarding those same "serious" people who spoke on the topic for decades. These were scholars. He is talking about state aligned broadcast outlets, which is a different group of "serious" people.

There had been a build-up of NATO military hardware and assets in Ukraine for eight years. It was a de facto NATO state, or becoming one. Or, Ukraine was not in NATO but NATO was definitely in Ukraine.

Yeah I agree with this part.

It's language like this that loses me. There was no demonization, just refutation of his overly simplistic arguments and selective use of facts. From what I read of him and why I think he was wrong, was because he didn't just try to say "NATO expansion was a factor" but he had articles and interviews where NATO/US was blamed for the invasion (tacitly excusing/minimizing Putin's actions). That is quite an extreme (and incorrect IMO) conclusion to draw. On the last page of this thread, a few posters made a compelling case completely refuting the angle that a "promise" was made yet Mearsheimer, a scholar, does not take all of these facts into account. That's why many people, including the NY Times article I linked, believe he is past his due date. That's not demonization but an acknowledgment that his views are flawed and shouldn't be held up as the gold standard of international relations.

 

[Mciahel Goodman]

There was no demonization, just refutation of his overly simplistic arguments and selective use of facts.

I'll have to check it again later but I think there was a fully fledged McCarthyite attempt to cancel him at one point (that's why I used that term).

That is quite an extreme (and incorrect IMO) conclusion to draw. On the last page of this thread, a few posters made a compelling case completely refuting the angle that a "promise" was made yet Mearsheimer, a scholar, does not take all of these facts into account. That's why many people, including the NY Times article I linked, believe he is past his due date. That's not demonization but an acknowledgment that his views are flawed and shouldn't be held up as the gold standard of international relations.

As for the rest, it depends on how you squint really. The "promise" issue is not conclusive except each side can, with decent levels of accuracy, say that they are right. The historical record backs up Gorbachev's claim (from Baker's diary) but then that it wasn't in writing leaves room for interpretation. It's not that he's even the gold standard, it's that the NATO line was absolutely rubbished for a time (there were many, many, others who predate and come after Mearsheimer who made similar arguments and some of these were/are involved directly with the US security apparatus.

 

[oneniltothearsenal]

I'll have to check it again later but I think there was a fully fledged McCarthyite attempt to cancel him at one point (that's why I used that term).

That sounds like extreme hyperbole and definitely doesn't describe the articles I've read in the New Yorker, NY Times, and The Atlantic. I think that's a bit extreme language that doesn't reflect the broader perspective.

As for the rest, it depends on how you squint really. The "promise" issue is not conclusive except each side can, with decent levels of accuracy, say that they are right. The historical record backs up Gorbachev's claim (from Baker's diary) but then that it wasn't in writing leaves room for interpretation. It's not that he's even the gold standard, it's that the NATO line was absolutely rubbished for a time (there were many, many, others who predate and come after Mearsheimer who made similar arguments and some of these were/are involved directly with the US security apparatus.

I don't see this as a "squinting" issue. Without a treaty in international relations, you can't declare there was a "promise." And others made compelling points about it not being reasonable to take an informal statement, made without US President approval during negotiations with a dissolving nation-state as some iron-clad promise to the new nation-state. I also don't think the historical record backs up any claims that a promise was made. this conclusion is pretty definitive from one of your own sources

For a moment in February 1990, the Soviet Union could have struck a deal with the United States, but it did not. Obviously any agreement among the Americans, West Germans, and Russians would have needed alliance approval, but in the political climate of 1990 it would have been possible to secure it. Even a written press release would have helped the Soviet cause. But Gorbachev did not secure one, and the window closed. Germany united and NATO began to move eastward.

Also, the idea that NATO expansion was the primary cause for Putin's invasion was rubbished by Putin's own words and actions that show he clearly had goals far beyond just "stopping NATO expansion."

 

[VorZakone]

That sounds like extreme hyperbole and definitely doesn't describe the articles I've read in the New Yorker, NY Times, and The Atlantic. I think that's a bit extreme language that doesn't reflect the broader perspective.




I don't see this as a "squinting" issue. Without a treaty in international relations, you can't declare there was a "promise." And others made compelling points about it not being reasonable to take an informal statement, made without US President approval during negotiations with a dissolving nation-state as some iron-clad promise to the new nation-state. I also don't think the historical record backs up any claims that a promise was made. this conclusion is pretty definitive from one of your own sources



Also, the idea that NATO expansion was the primary cause for Putin's invasion was rubbished by Putin's own words and actions that show he clearly had goals far beyond just "stopping NATO expansion."

You mean denazification? I wouldn't take that seriously. Seems meant for domestic consumption.

 

[oneniltothearsenal]

You mean denazification? I wouldn't take that seriously. Seems meant for domestic consumption.

That's his euphemism for regime change which, again, goes far beyond just preventing NATO expansion. He clearly doesn't want a liberal democracy next door (irrespective of whether it's in NATO) and clearly wants influence over Ukraine both politically and economically the way he has over Lukashenko and Kadyrov.

Also, what Putin might settle for now or in the coming months doesn't prove what his goals were because by every account this has been a disastrous performance by Russia so clearly he'd settle for much less than he originally intended.

 

[Raoul]

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Mehdi doesn't know what he's talking about. His account is becoming a bit trollish lately, which is problematic for an MSNBC employee.

 

[VorZakone]

That's his euphemism for regime change which, again, goes far beyond just preventing NATO expansion. He clearly doesn't want a liberal democracy next door (irrespective of whether it's in NATO) and clearly wants influence over Ukraine both politically and economically the way he has over Lukashenko and Kadyrov.

Also, what Putin might settle for now or in the coming months doesn't prove what his goals were because by every account this has been a disastrous performance by Russia so clearly he'd settle for much less than he originally intended.

Right. But what if he specifically wants influence over Ukraine to steer them away from potential NATO membership. Influence over Ukraine and preventing NATO-expansion don't have to be mutually exclusive in that regard.

With regards to a liberal democracy next door whether it's NATO or not, I'm not sure. It seems a valid point and probably is, but the Baltics are liberal democracies too and that doesn't seem to have induced the Russian population to get ideas on a large scale. Because that's what the Putin regime fears, isn't it?

 

[Mciahel Goodman]

That sounds like extreme hyperbole and definitely doesn't describe the articles I've read in the New Yorker, NY Times, and The Atlantic. I think that's a bit extreme language that doesn't reflect the broader perspective.

Maybe, but he was the subject of a petition to have him resign, be fired, or else pronounce his loyalty to Ukraine. Might not reflect the broader perpective, but it happened. Will look again.

I don't see this as a "squinting" issue. Without a treaty in international relations, you can't declare there was a "promise." And others made compelling points about it not being reasonable to take an informal statement, made without US President approval during negotiations with a dissolving nation-state as some iron-clad promise to the new nation-state. I also don't think the historical record backs up any claims that a promise was made. this conclusion is pretty definitive from one of your own sources

Gorbachev acted on the "promise" and Baker's "we agree with this" (speaking on behalf of the president). The source I used is ultimately bifurcated and leaves an ambiguous reading, which PedroMendez rightly pointed out (though you can read it which way you want, the essence of ambiguity).

Also, the idea that NATO expansion was the primary cause for Putin's invasion was rubbished by Putin's own words and actions that show he clearly had goals far beyond just "stopping NATO expansion."

It's not an insane argument. Why not invade Finland? If it's just democracy and freedom that Putin despises? Flippant, but there's a point there. NATO clearly played a significant role. From the Maidan Coup to the eight years of funding and military aid, to plans of infrastructure, to Ukraine moving back and forth on whether it would join. Didn't Ukraine enshrine "joining NATO" in their constitution in 2019 so every president woud be obligated to make an effort to join? Maybe I picked that part up wrong. Also, NATO's tactic of accepting Ukraine's efforts publicly but never committing to refusal outright despite apparently never entertaining the idea of Ukraine joining (what exactly were they doing there for eight years if there was no prospect of Ukraine joining? What are they doing there now?).

Mehdi doesn't know what he's talking about. His account is becoming a bit trollish lately, which is problematic for an MSNBC employee.

Yeah I'm not a fan of his, but his conclusion here is standard enough (NATO absolutely a [significant] factor, Putin absolutely to blame).

 

[oneniltothearsenal]

Right. But what if he specifically wants influence over Ukraine to steer them away from potential NATO membership. Influence over Ukraine and preventing NATO-expansion don't have to be mutually exclusive in that regard.

With regards to a liberal democracy next door whether it's NATO or not, I'm not sure. It seems a valid point and probably is, but the Baltics are liberal democracies too and that doesn't seem to have induced the Russian population to get ideas on a large scale. Because that's what the Putin regime fears, isn't it?

I think it's very generous (and naive) to believe that Putin only wants influence over Ukraine to steer them away from NATO. It's clear from his actions that his intention goes quite a bit beyond just that. If that was his only motivating factor, he picked the worst strategy to achieve that.

Maybe, but he was the subject of a petition to have him resign, be fired, or else pronounce his loyalty to Ukraine. Might not reflect the broader perpective, but it happened. Will look again.

Comparing something to McCarthy isn't a light comparison. McCarthy was a US Senator who wielded tremendous power in his heyday. It's really not remotely the same as a few loud voices on Twitter. There were plenty of people that disagree with Merisheimer like the NY Times article I linked that goes nowhere near what McCarthy did so I just think that's hyperbole that really doesn't accurately describe what happened.

Gorbachev acted on the "promise" and Baker's "we agree with this" (speaking on behalf of the president). The source I used is ultimately bifurcated and leaves an ambiguous reading, which PedroMendez rightly pointed out (though you can read it which way you want, the essence of ambiguity).

I think it was much less ambiguous than you make out. The quote that I re-posted was pretty clear. It's also without contention that there was never a clause in any treaty. I think you undervalue how much treaties and official agreements actually mean when it comes to claiming something is a "promise." It never had the agreement of the US President at the time and was never part of any formal agreement so it can't be a promise.

It's not an insane argument. Why not invade Finland? If it's just democracy and freedom that Putin despises? Flippant, but there's a point there. NATO clearly played a significant role. From the Maidan Coup to the eight years of funding and military aid, to plans of infrastructure, to Ukraine moving back and forth on whether it would join. Didn't Ukraine enshrine "joining NATO" in their constitution in 2019 so every president woud be obligated to make an effort to join? Maybe I picked that part up wrong. Also, NATO's tactic of accepting Ukraine's efforts publicly but never committing to refusal outright despite apparently never entertaining the idea of Ukraine joining (what exactly were they doing there for eight years if there was no prospect of Ukraine joining? What are they doing there now?).

Yeah I'm not a fan of his, but his conclusion here is standard enough (NATO absolutely a [significant] factor, Putin absolutely to blame).

I'm sure Putin would if he could. Invading Finland would be a completely different situation and a different set of calculations. It also wouldn't make strategic sense to invade Finland before Ukraine.

Anyway, we aren't likely to ever agree here since I don't see the evidence to support a claim that NATO expansion was a primary factor in Russia's invasion. It simply wasn't a necessary or sufficient condition.

And as I mentioned I don't see that assertion fitting Putin's actual strategy since invading. I think Mearshiemer (for one) is dead wrong that a Ukraine that was a liberal democracy, with close economic ties to the west and basically doing the same things but just not looking to join NATO would have somehow meant Putin never would have invaded.

 

[nickm]

Yeah I'm not a fan of his, but his conclusion here is standard enough (NATO absolutely a [significant] factor, Putin absolutely to blame).

He's confusing causes and symptoms.

The basic issue is that Putin can't accept that Ukraine is an independent state that wishes to move away from its historic ties to Russia. That's the basic cause. All the other stuff - Maidan, EU, NATO, the current war etc are symptoms of Ukraine's developing European statehood.

 

[Smores]

He's confusing causes and symptoms.

The basic issue is that Putin can't accept that Ukraine is an independent state that wishes to move away from its historic ties to Russia. That's the basic cause. All the other stuff - Maidan, EU, NATO, the current war etc are symptoms of Ukraine's developing European statehood.

Whilst i don't disagree with any of that, if Ukraine didn't share a border and didn't have strategic pipelines do you think Russia would care about it's Europe leaning ambitions? The geography is obviously relevant which is why both can be true.

 

[Mciahel Goodman]

He's confusing causes and symptoms.

The basic issue is that Putin can't accept that Ukraine is an independent state that wishes to move away from its historic ties to Russia. That's the basic cause. All the other stuff - Maidan, EU, NATO, the current war etc are symptoms of Ukraine's developing European statehood.

I would agree with that (the majority of Ukraine wants to move away from Russia and integrate into Europe, and this was true before the war and has been for a while). I would add that the Donbas and Crimea are not the same and the majority want to retain their Russian identity. That's also a large part of the problem. Also, I don't think Putin cares that much about the EU as he gave that up almost immediately in the negotiations from what I can see.

 

[Suedesi]

"Putin Lives in Historic Analogies and Metaphors"

There's some nuggets here that apply better to this thread than the invasion one...

@Mciahel Goodman

 

[Mciahel Goodman]

"Putin Lives in Historic Analogies and Metaphors"

There's some nuggets here that apply better to this thread than the invasion one...

@Mciahel Goodman

This part interested me the most (in the context of some discussion in this thread):

DER SPIEGEL: The decisions made by Europe could have been largely driven by fear. Such decisions aren’t generally the correct ones, are they?

Krastev: Of course fear plays a role. There are two types of threats: One comes from people, the other from nature. Putin’s power to mobilize is greater than that of climate change.

DER SPIEGEL: Because it is easier to identify the enemy.

Krastev: This crisis has destroyed a couple of stereotypes. The Germans have slaughtered two sacred cows. Nord Stream 2 as a symbol of German mercantilism, and pacifism as a symbol of German moralism. Even stereotypes about Eastern Europe have disappeared. Suddenly, the unempathetic East is bending over backwards to take in refugees. And all that is happening because there is an identifiable enemy. The Polish government hasn’t suddenly become more democratic in the last two weeks, but it did realize that the true threat to its sovereignty isn’t coming from Brussels, but from Moscow.

DER SPIEGEL: And what about the United States?

Krastev: I think the strong sanctions from the U.S. have less to do with saving Ukraine. America is more strategic than it is emotional. By imposing the sanctions, they want to save Taiwan by showing China the price of an intervention.

DER SPIEGEL: How will Putin end? The Russians aren’t known for being particularly rebellious.

Krastev: People die. That also applies to Putin. The changes will be so significant that the regime will have to change in order to survive, just as will happen in Europe as well. Our economy will change, as will our understanding of freedom and democracy. Already, the media has changed in order to fight the disinformation coming out of Russia. That will have consequences.

DER SPIEGEL: How do you mean?

Krastev: We are closing down Russia Today and other outlets. We will become less tolerant.

DER SPIEGEL: We are betraying the freedom of opinion?

Krastev: Perhaps. Because of the pandemic and this war, the state again plays a larger role. In the pandemic, it was the welfare state that cared for its citizens and kept them alive. In this war, it is the security state that doesn’t just protect its citizens, but could also demand something from them: Namely, the readiness to make sacrifices. A friend of mine works at one of the biggest business schools. I told him: Everything you are teaching is useless. Just as useless as teaching socialism studies was in 1990. The world of globalization and free trade, in which the economy was only interested in bottom lines and not in politics, will be over. We don’t know what will happen in Russia after Putin, or in Europe, which currently finds itself in a romantic phase. But we shouldn’t make the same mistakes as in 1989. Back then, we thought the East would change dramatically, but not the West.

Now, Russia is going to change dramatically. But so will we.

DER SPIEGEL: Mr. Krastev, we thank you for this interview.

 

[Suedesi]

Indeed - thought you'd enjoy the last part

 

[Suedesi]

 

[RedTiger]

Makes my blood boil just listening to his holier than thou spiel. I'm talking about the CIA guy and not Pilger.

 

[MTF]

Dewey Clarridge was a bit of a nut. I liken him to being a sort of Erik Prince of the espionage world, given his private intelligence activities after he left the CIA. Not that it changes that the US did actively help Pinochet oust Allende, and then supported Pinochet's government, but just that Clarridge's attitude about it is erm... not the norm.

 

[entropy]

there is no such thing as a good american foreign policy. just pure evil.