He can still declare actual war and call a draft.
Russian invasion of Ukraine | Fewer tweets, more discussion
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And those draftees would last an even shorter amount of time than the actual “trained” soldiers he’s already got in Ukraine.
As if he cares about that. It's a time honored Russian military tradition to win wars by throwing numbers at it. The point is he still has escalation options.
He's resisted it because Russians are largely apathetic about the special operation. That could change when it's a war with a large scale draft.
Key difference though is I do not believe it’ll change the situation on the ground. Russian command can’t even properly direct the forces they currently have, and they’re already using outdated equipment. They’re going to be poorly led and even worse armed.
More of a WW1 situation than a WW2.
edit - but yes, you are right in that that is his last card to play aside from the nukes
and also expands the response of western powers, including the sanctions. Full mobilisation and declaration could actually see countries declaring to join Ukraine and Europe goes to war. Considering how they have performed so far that's a massive gamble for Russia. A lot EU/NATO/Western states are only acting as proxies and are humiliating Russia. More troops and equipment flowing openly into the Ukrainian ranks is not a light matter for Russia right now.
Another problem is that China is not likely to support a full escalation into a European Conflict. Russia cannot lose China right now or that is when the Coup against Putin will really look like a good idea.
Killing off all their young men is the last thing Russia needs. Population is already in decline. Someone needs to take Putin out and find a resolution.
Declaring war and calling a draft, as disastrous as it will likely be for many young Russians, could also be the path to actually end the war, due to how it will be received inside Russia. It's a bad move, but everything is either a bad move or an intolerable move for putin right now.
Very true indeed.
Just like in WW1, the Germans never had to go to St. Petersburg. The Russian Army did it for them.
Heard about this on the radio and read about this on the BBC website.
This is fantastic news and shows just how well trained the Ukrainian troops are and how well planned this offensive was against the Russian invading forces.
Great news.
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-62860774
This is fantastic news and shows just how well trained the Ukrainian troops are and how well planned this offensive was against the Russian invading forces.
Great news.
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-62860774
The last generating unit was shut down in Zaporizhzhia last night so reactors are now being cooled by external power supply. It would be a perfect time for a nuclear incident with the Russians withdrawing, better way of clearing a no go area than using nuclear weapons. Could the Russians evacuate the power station and leave remote devices and claim it wasn`t them?
Let's hope Russia inflicts a "powerful fire defeat on the enemy" all the way back to their own territory.
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So looks like Ukraine have recovered up to 10% of their territorial losses since the start of the war in the space of a few days. Very impressive:
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Soon Ukraine will have more tanks than Russia if they continue running away and leaving everything behind (or how Russian MoD would say, regrouping).
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That entire area marked blue is pretty much all confirmed as retaken by Ukraine by now with further confirmations coming every few hours or so. It's likely Russians have retreated even further than the Oskil river, with strong rumours that they ran as far as Svatov which is about 30km east of the river.
I have to admit that as a Dane I have feck all understanding of Ukraine and its geography. I'm happy that others do. I know Kyiv and that's about it.
You get a tank, and you get a tank...
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Ukraine defeats Russia in Kharkiv
What began as a probing attack by Ukrainian mechanised forces towards the occupied town of Balakliia on 7 September has, with astonishing swiftness, turned into one of the most emphatic military victories in modern history. Having found a weak point in the Russian lines at Balakliia, Ukrainian forces swiftly advanced overnight to the town of Volokhiv Yar, and continued driving towards Sevchenkove during the morning of the 8th. Russian forces in the region were hurriedly sent to Sevchenkove to stall what was rapidly becoming a clear danger to a significant section of the frontlines around Chkalovske. However, by the time Russian forces began to arrive, the Ukrainian spearhead had already been rapidly reinforced with mobile reserves, as Ukrainian commanders pushed in units to take advantage of the unexpectedly rapid advance. This rapid Ukrainian reinforcement of local success allowed its spearhead forces to encircle and then bypass Sevchenkove rather than stopping to fully defeat Russian forces there, driving on towards the strategically critical railhead junction city of Kupyansk.
Since April, Russian offensive operations have concentrated on the Donbas region, comprising Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts. The offensive operations against the critical Ukrainian city of Sovlyansk and the town of Barvinkove in Donetsk were conducted from and supplied through the city of Izyum. After months of bitter fighting, the thousands of Russian troops in Izyum were secure in highly fortified positions and had large stockpiles of ammunition, artillery, armoured vehicles and command and control equipment. However, due to the pattern of roads and railway infrastructure in northern Ukraine, all the major supply routes to Izyum from Russia itself go through Kupyansk to the north. Thus, when it became clear on the morning of 9 September that Ukrainian forces had reached Kupyansk, panic set in throughout the Russian military establishment, and among pro-Russian media and social media commentators. Suddenly, a highly fortified and well garrisoned area of the Russian-Ukrainian frontline to the north of Donbas was cut off from resupply, reinforcement or retreat via any large highways or railways. As Russian panic spread, Ukrainian forces maintained the initiative, pushing mobile reserves in to secure and expand the corridor of liberated territory from Balakliia to Kupyansk, while spearheads drove south down the banks of the Oskil river towards Izyum itself. At the same time, Ukrainian units around Slovyansk in the Donbas began attacking north towards Izyum and Lyman to threaten a complete encirclement of Russian forces in Izyum.
Thanks to the long-signalled and still ongoing Ukrainian counter-offensive in Kherson, Russia’s usable reserve forces had almost all been redeployed to the southern front. As such, once the frontlines had been breached and locally available reserve force had been isolated, Ukrainian forces were suddenly able to advance almost unhindered. Thanks to the presence of medium-range SA-11 surface-to-air missile systems, German-supplied Gepard mobile anti-aircraft guns and shoulder-fired Manpads, Russian fixed wing aircraft and helicopter gunships were also unable to effectively delay or attrit the Ukrainian force.
The result is the most dramatic collapse of Russian forces in Ukraine since the attempt to take Kyiv was abandoned in April, with the Russian Ministry of Defence acknowledging that its forces have abandoned (or 'regrouped from' in their language) all their remaining positions in Kharkiv Oblast. Desperate to escape encirclement, and with all the major roads and railway links with Russian-held territory cut, Russian units have largely abandoned their heavy equipment and streamed on foot and in stolen civilian vehicles through the Oleksandrivka gap to reach the eastern side of the Oskil river. Many thousands will have been captured, and with the capture of Izyum Ukraine has not only liberated a vast swathe of territory, but also captured huge stockpiles of Russian ammunition and armoured vehicles that will bolster its forces in the battles still to come.
The immediate and medium-term prospects for Russia are grim. Ukraine’s stunning Kharkiv offensive victory is an unmitigated military disaster for the Kremlin, and one that will demand a rapid response. However, all of the potential choices for how to respond are deeply problematic. Essentially the biggest problem facing Russia is that it simply does not have enough infantry to properly defend the thousand kilometres of frontline that it has, and prevent partisan and special forces attacks behind the lines, while also retaining reserve forces to respond to Ukrainian breakthroughs or reinforce local Russian successes.
The Ukrainian counter-offensive in Kherson was not a feint or a distraction, though it was undoubtedly intended to draw Russian forces to an area where they could be relatively easily isolated and then attritted by artillery. The fighting is still intense and Ukrainian forces are still gaining territory back on that front. Therefore, Russia cannot easily withdraw its elite units currently defending Kherson across the Dnipro to help reinforce its collapsing position in Donetsk. For one thing, morale could now easily collapse throughout the Russian Army as the scale of the northern defeat becomes widely known. Secondly, if the defending forces are depleted by redeployment, Ukrainian forces could inflict a second rout on the Kherson front before winter arrives. Thirdly, with the Antonivskyi Bridge and the crossing at Nova Kakhovka rendered unusable for heavy vehicles by continued Himars strikes and temporary pontoon bridges and ferries being regularly struck too, it is not even clear that Russia can redeploy most of the heavy equipment now on the West bank of the Dnipro to use elsewhere. If Russia attempts to pull troops from other, more thinly manned areas of frontline, then Ukrainian probing attacks will likely discover those weak points and take advantage of them to make further advances.
Russia has been trying to build up significant new forces in Russia itself using troops drawn from newly conscripted and mobilised reserve personnel. The 3rd Army Corps was formed in June and has been receiving significant quantities of high-end equipment, presumably to allow Russia to renew offensive operations once the weather allows in Spring 2023. However, now elements have been transferred to the Kharkiv front in an unsuccessful attempt to stem the Ukrainian breakthrough. If Russia tries to use the bulk of this new formation and other freshly raised troops to consolidate its faltering position this side of Winter, then it will be risking huge losses among forces that have not had time to train properly after being mobilised, and squandering any chance of having a renewed reserve to regain the initiative in Spring.
It remains to be seen how much further Ukrainian forces can advance without risking overstretch in the coming weeks, and whether Russian forces will suffer further systemic collapses and losses of captured territory. Even if they do, it looks unlikely at this stage that Ukraine can win the war before the worsening weather compels a halt to large scale offensive operations for both sides in November. However, by inflicting such a dramatic defeat on Russian forces in Kharkiv and presenting the Russian military with a major challenge to simply avoid further disasters, Ukraine has put itself in a dominant strategic position.
There can be no more questions from Western partner nations about the long-term prospects for Ukrainian victory on the battlefield, which should help guarantee continued large-scale support throughout what promises to be a very economically and politically difficult winter. The Ukrainian government will now be highly resilient against Russian-sponsored narratives that aim to undermine domestic faith in the Zelenskyy government. The Russian leadership faces very awkward questions about its decision to invade and the way in which it has conducted the war, and has also lost any semblance of a bargaining position to try and compel Ukraine to negotiate a settlement that might lock in some Russian gains. Finally, in the all-important area of morale, Ukrainian troops will be going into a muddy, cold and dangerous winter period with confidence in their victory, while Russian troops must come to terms with a major defeat, heavy losses, the obvious lies of their leaders, and fear of what the Spring will bring.
What began as a probing attack by Ukrainian mechanised forces towards the occupied town of Balakliia on 7 September has, with astonishing swiftness, turned into one of the most emphatic military victories in modern history. Having found a weak point in the Russian lines at Balakliia, Ukrainian forces swiftly advanced overnight to the town of Volokhiv Yar, and continued driving towards Sevchenkove during the morning of the 8th. Russian forces in the region were hurriedly sent to Sevchenkove to stall what was rapidly becoming a clear danger to a significant section of the frontlines around Chkalovske. However, by the time Russian forces began to arrive, the Ukrainian spearhead had already been rapidly reinforced with mobile reserves, as Ukrainian commanders pushed in units to take advantage of the unexpectedly rapid advance. This rapid Ukrainian reinforcement of local success allowed its spearhead forces to encircle and then bypass Sevchenkove rather than stopping to fully defeat Russian forces there, driving on towards the strategically critical railhead junction city of Kupyansk.
Since April, Russian offensive operations have concentrated on the Donbas region, comprising Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts. The offensive operations against the critical Ukrainian city of Sovlyansk and the town of Barvinkove in Donetsk were conducted from and supplied through the city of Izyum. After months of bitter fighting, the thousands of Russian troops in Izyum were secure in highly fortified positions and had large stockpiles of ammunition, artillery, armoured vehicles and command and control equipment. However, due to the pattern of roads and railway infrastructure in northern Ukraine, all the major supply routes to Izyum from Russia itself go through Kupyansk to the north. Thus, when it became clear on the morning of 9 September that Ukrainian forces had reached Kupyansk, panic set in throughout the Russian military establishment, and among pro-Russian media and social media commentators. Suddenly, a highly fortified and well garrisoned area of the Russian-Ukrainian frontline to the north of Donbas was cut off from resupply, reinforcement or retreat via any large highways or railways. As Russian panic spread, Ukrainian forces maintained the initiative, pushing mobile reserves in to secure and expand the corridor of liberated territory from Balakliia to Kupyansk, while spearheads drove south down the banks of the Oskil river towards Izyum itself. At the same time, Ukrainian units around Slovyansk in the Donbas began attacking north towards Izyum and Lyman to threaten a complete encirclement of Russian forces in Izyum.
Thanks to the long-signalled and still ongoing Ukrainian counter-offensive in Kherson, Russia’s usable reserve forces had almost all been redeployed to the southern front. As such, once the frontlines had been breached and locally available reserve force had been isolated, Ukrainian forces were suddenly able to advance almost unhindered. Thanks to the presence of medium-range SA-11 surface-to-air missile systems, German-supplied Gepard mobile anti-aircraft guns and shoulder-fired Manpads, Russian fixed wing aircraft and helicopter gunships were also unable to effectively delay or attrit the Ukrainian force.
The result is the most dramatic collapse of Russian forces in Ukraine since the attempt to take Kyiv was abandoned in April, with the Russian Ministry of Defence acknowledging that its forces have abandoned (or 'regrouped from' in their language) all their remaining positions in Kharkiv Oblast. Desperate to escape encirclement, and with all the major roads and railway links with Russian-held territory cut, Russian units have largely abandoned their heavy equipment and streamed on foot and in stolen civilian vehicles through the Oleksandrivka gap to reach the eastern side of the Oskil river. Many thousands will have been captured, and with the capture of Izyum Ukraine has not only liberated a vast swathe of territory, but also captured huge stockpiles of Russian ammunition and armoured vehicles that will bolster its forces in the battles still to come.
The immediate and medium-term prospects for Russia are grim. Ukraine’s stunning Kharkiv offensive victory is an unmitigated military disaster for the Kremlin, and one that will demand a rapid response. However, all of the potential choices for how to respond are deeply problematic. Essentially the biggest problem facing Russia is that it simply does not have enough infantry to properly defend the thousand kilometres of frontline that it has, and prevent partisan and special forces attacks behind the lines, while also retaining reserve forces to respond to Ukrainian breakthroughs or reinforce local Russian successes.
The Ukrainian counter-offensive in Kherson was not a feint or a distraction, though it was undoubtedly intended to draw Russian forces to an area where they could be relatively easily isolated and then attritted by artillery. The fighting is still intense and Ukrainian forces are still gaining territory back on that front. Therefore, Russia cannot easily withdraw its elite units currently defending Kherson across the Dnipro to help reinforce its collapsing position in Donetsk. For one thing, morale could now easily collapse throughout the Russian Army as the scale of the northern defeat becomes widely known. Secondly, if the defending forces are depleted by redeployment, Ukrainian forces could inflict a second rout on the Kherson front before winter arrives. Thirdly, with the Antonivskyi Bridge and the crossing at Nova Kakhovka rendered unusable for heavy vehicles by continued Himars strikes and temporary pontoon bridges and ferries being regularly struck too, it is not even clear that Russia can redeploy most of the heavy equipment now on the West bank of the Dnipro to use elsewhere. If Russia attempts to pull troops from other, more thinly manned areas of frontline, then Ukrainian probing attacks will likely discover those weak points and take advantage of them to make further advances.
Russia has been trying to build up significant new forces in Russia itself using troops drawn from newly conscripted and mobilised reserve personnel. The 3rd Army Corps was formed in June and has been receiving significant quantities of high-end equipment, presumably to allow Russia to renew offensive operations once the weather allows in Spring 2023. However, now elements have been transferred to the Kharkiv front in an unsuccessful attempt to stem the Ukrainian breakthrough. If Russia tries to use the bulk of this new formation and other freshly raised troops to consolidate its faltering position this side of Winter, then it will be risking huge losses among forces that have not had time to train properly after being mobilised, and squandering any chance of having a renewed reserve to regain the initiative in Spring.
It remains to be seen how much further Ukrainian forces can advance without risking overstretch in the coming weeks, and whether Russian forces will suffer further systemic collapses and losses of captured territory. Even if they do, it looks unlikely at this stage that Ukraine can win the war before the worsening weather compels a halt to large scale offensive operations for both sides in November. However, by inflicting such a dramatic defeat on Russian forces in Kharkiv and presenting the Russian military with a major challenge to simply avoid further disasters, Ukraine has put itself in a dominant strategic position.
There can be no more questions from Western partner nations about the long-term prospects for Ukrainian victory on the battlefield, which should help guarantee continued large-scale support throughout what promises to be a very economically and politically difficult winter. The Ukrainian government will now be highly resilient against Russian-sponsored narratives that aim to undermine domestic faith in the Zelenskyy government. The Russian leadership faces very awkward questions about its decision to invade and the way in which it has conducted the war, and has also lost any semblance of a bargaining position to try and compel Ukraine to negotiate a settlement that might lock in some Russian gains. Finally, in the all-important area of morale, Ukrainian troops will be going into a muddy, cold and dangerous winter period with confidence in their victory, while Russian troops must come to terms with a major defeat, heavy losses, the obvious lies of their leaders, and fear of what the Spring will bring.
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Treat with caution.
True or not, I'm surprised Russian troops have tolerated being terrorized by the Kadyrov units for so long.
I really hope Ukraine has some power in reserve here. Would be great to see a concerted push towards Mariupol to split the occupation zone into two before the winter, assuming of course that the conflict goes on that long.
Not exactly an orderly retreat. It'll be difficult for them to regroup and attack the Ukrainian forces again now that they've seemingly left all their hardware.
He did that a lot at the beginning as well. He’s a bit of a loose cannon and he’s only answering to Putin personally (and it’s unlikely that Putin has time to manage him at the moment), plus he’s extremely obsessed with creating this no-nonsense macho public image of himself.
By saying this he distanced himself from the failures on the ground and continues to remind everyone that he has an option to contact Putin directly.
Lots of chatter about them moving in that direction, through Vuhldehar apparently (?), but I don’t know what to believe just yet…
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No, and as that guy alludes to, we simply don't know whether Ukraine has those reserves at all. It may have no-one or it may have enough for another two fronts for all we know. I think we're at a point where we can reasonably confidently say that the Ukranians aren't going to do anything stupid and over-commit forces that they need elsewhere and then can't disengage. They seem too well informed of Russian strength and troop movements to make that mistake. Earlier in the war I often wondered whether Putin really had given up on the idea of a mad 48 hour dash to Kyiv to cut off the head of the enemy, but the level of intelligence coming from the US/UK makes me confident that if that plan was being made then the US would know about it before the Russian officers in Belarus who 'd actually execute the plan would even know.
Latest map from pro Russian Telgram channel Rybar.
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Ukraine has made a decent progress in Kherson too in the past few days even though it was of course overshadowed by the Kharkiv news.
He is also distancing himself from the established leadership in Russia by those comments. He is only reporting to Putin, but what happens if Putin is gone? Will Kadyrov stay in the fold or if the Russian/Putin government collapses will he try to finally have Chechnya fully souvereign and independent from Russia? After all the Chechnyan troops are sworn in personally on him and not on Russia/Putin...
Not bad for a decoy operation.
Who knows, really. I doubt that Kadyrov is really interested in independence — Chechen economy is hugely reliant on the financial support from federal government. It’s been the trade-off between Putin and Akhmat Kadyrov (Ramzan’s father) — Putin showers Kadyrov with money and gives him virtually free reign over Chechnya, Kadyrov destroys the internal movement for Chechnya’s (or Ichkeria as they wanted to be called) independence and ensures that the terrorist threat to other Russian regions stops.
Without the money from the Russian federal budget Chechnya would be a very poor and still politically insignificant state and Kadyrov’s personal influence would for sure be significantly diminished.
Another scenario where Kadyrov tries to increase his influence over Russia and, say, tries to become Putin’s successor (I doubt that he’s interested in any other role) is also pretty much impossible to imagine if only because of the innate Russian nationalism — Chechnya & chechens were the boogie men of late 90’s-00’s and there’s still a significant dislike-to-hatred for people from Caucasian republics in general Russian population (denazification my ass).
Forgive my ignorance but all these Chechen soldiers.
Obviously they are being paid but surely there will be a time where they say “feck that I’m not dying in this shitshow “?
Maybe, but I think their role is making sure that conscripts die before them. IE they are not so much on the frontline but used as "morale boosters".
Moreover, I think Kadyrov understands his fate and power structure are tied to Putin's survival and financial support, which is why he's losing the plot a bit about failures in Ukraine lately - because that weakens Putin from within, and by extension Kadyrov as well.
Аrent they more of a blocking force?