Mourinho at Madrid was not motivated merely by winning – which had been almost his sole objective elsewhere – but by the desire to do so in his way, to establish himself as a tactical pioneer. Mourinho spoke repeatedly of the
trivote, his triangle of aggressive, hard-tackling midfielders who could either win the ball back high up the pitch or offer an impenetrable block in front of the defensive four. Mourinho was so attached to this system that he played it at times when, as Torres’s sources saw it, it was of limited benefit and meant using players out of position. It was as though Mourinho was determined above all else to promote his own legend.
The Champions League semi-final was played out in
a sulphurous atmosphere, largely of Mourinho’s making. Madrid did little but spoil: even if Barça did dive and whinge, at its heart the rivalry had become about one team passing and dribbling, the other kicking and brawling; light against dark, football against anti-football. In Mourinho’s 17 matches against Barcelona as Madrid manager, his side committed 346 fouls to Barcelona’s 220.
According to Torres, Mourinho laid out a simple seven-point plan for winning big games:
1) The game is won by the team who commits fewer errors.
2) Football favours whoever provokes more errors in the opposition.
3) Away from home, instead of trying to be superior to the opposition, it’s better to encourage their mistakes.
4) Whoever has the ball is more likely to make a mistake.
5) Whoever renounces possession reduces the possibility of making a mistake.
6) Whoever has the ball has fear.
7) Whoever does not have it is thereby stronger.
This is the antithesis of the Barçajax approach, a categorical rejection of the possession-based, proactive approach of Guardiola and his ilk. It was precisely how Inter had played in that Champions League semi-final but there was always a sense at Madrid that it was somehow unworthy of the club.
The bitterness between Guardiola’s Barça and Mourinho’s Madrid carried over into the following season, and was exemplified by a Barça-Madrid match that ended with two red cards in injury time and a brawl in which
Mourinho poked Tito Vilanova, the Barça assistant coach, in the eye from behind. It was an act of cowardice and petulance that would have profound consequences.
On 7 May 2013, towards the end of a disappointing season for Madrid, Mourinho arrived alone at the Sheraton Madrid Mirasierra to prepare for a league game against Malaga, having refused to travel with his players after accusing them of disloyalty. A contingent of the Ultras Sur, who saw themselves as Madrid’s most devoted fans, were waiting for Mourinho with a banner that proclaimed their love for him. There was effectively a state of open warfare between Mourinho and the club captain Iker Casillas. That Mourinho’s fractious time at the club was coming to an end was not in any real doubt. And for Mourinho, things were about to get much worse.