Freedom of speech is considered an “essential freedom” in France. It is protected by the 1789 Declaration of Human and Civic Rights, which is incorporated by reference into the French Constitution. It is also protected by the European Convention on Human Rights, to which France is a party. Yet, while French law considers free speech to be an essential component of a democratic society, it is not seen as absolute. French legislators, and French courts, seek to balance freedom of speech with other imperatives, such as other freedoms and rights, and public order. Thus, freedom of expression may be limited for the sake of protecting privacy, protecting the presumption of innocence, and preventing defamation and insults. Freedom of expression may also be limited for the sake of protecting public order. It is therefore illegal to incite others to commit a crime, even when no crime ends up being actually committed. French law also prohibits hate speech, and speech denying or justifying the Holocaust and other crimes against humanity. Additionally, French law prohibits defamation against government institutions and office-holders, as well as disrespecting the national anthem and flag in the context of public events organized or regulated by public authorities.
Despite its foundational importance, freedom of speech was never intended to be absolute. In contrast to the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, the 1789 Declaration of Human and Civic Rights provided limits to freedom of expression in its very definition.
Article 10 declares that “[n]o one may be disturbed on account of his opinions, even religious ones, as long as the manifestation of such opinions does not interfere with the established Law and Order.” Article 11 provides that “[a]ny citizen may therefore speak, write and publish freely, except what is tantamount to the abuse of this liberty in the cases determined by Law.” Similarly, the European Convention on Human Rights declares that
Thus, French law seeks to balance freedom of speech with other imperatives, as shown by extensive jurisprudence on this topic. The Cour de cassation, France’s highest court for civil and criminal matters, established the general principle that “restrictions to freedom of expression should be interpreted narrowly.” They must also be proportional to the expected harm, as shown by a 1933 decision by the Council of State, which is the highest French jurisdiction for matters of administrative law. In that case, the mayor of the City of Nevers prohibited the plaintiff from holding a public meeting, in response to protests from teachers’ unions (the plaintiff had a history of mocking teachers in his speeches). The Council of State struck down the mayor’s order prohibiting the meeting on the grounds that it was disproportional to the risk of public disorder that the meeting presented. While this decision was, strictly speaking, a freedom of assembly case, its principle of proportionality applies to freedom of expression as well.
For example, it was cited in a 2014 decision in which the Council of State upheld the prohibition of a public performance by controversial comedian Dieudonné M’bala M’bala, because it was justified by the high risk that he would disturb public order by engaging in illegal hate speech.
Furthermore, the Law of 29 July 1881 on Freedom of the Press, which is still in force (although it has been amended numerous times since its original adoption), prohibits defamation and insults, both written and verbal. The Law of 29 July 1881 defines “defamation” as “any allegation or imputation of a fact which harms the honor or consideration of the person or group to which the fact is imputed.” The same provision defines “insult” as “any offensive expression, term of contempt, or invective which does not contain the imputation of any fact.” The legislators have tried to find a balance between freedom of speech and the prohibitions against defamation and insult. Thus, speech may not be considered defamation if it can be shown to have been expressed in good faith, or if it is true—although the “exception of truth” is itself limited by the right to privacy, meaning that a true statement may still be considered defaming if it concerns a person’s private life.
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/freedom-expression/france.php