Gehrman
Phallic connoisseur, unlike shamans
- Joined
- Feb 20, 2019
- Messages
- 11,273
Seriously?No, Poland are planning to buy 500.
Seriously?No, Poland are planning to buy 500.
Yes, but this isn't news. Poland is in the process of acquiring customized HIMARS systems (most important change the integration on Polish made trucks instead of the standard US model) since 2017, originally they wanted about 160 units. Two months ago they announced they will be acquiring "up to 500" systems. This would give Poland the numerically strongest rocket artillery in NATO and looking at how effective the HIMARS systems are compared to the smaller Russian models maybe effectively, but not in numbers, even in the worldSeriously?
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Hope voters in the US come to realise which country the Republicans really want to "make great again".
In addition to what others have pointed out in differences of military doctrine, many nations use different size shells so they didn’t have stockpiles of ammo to send and some of those that did could not be arsed to help. So now we’re replacing their artillery with whole new systems which is an order of magnitude more complicated.Since artillery has been one of Russias main advantages, I don't get why the west can't flood Ukraine with Artillery. I mean our stocks of them must be high.
Bigger weapons like what?If ukraine starts taking land back, how long before putin uses bigger weapons? Surely he won't just lose, right?
Big bombs, wmd's.Bigger weapons like what?
Or a false flag chemical weapons attack, which is something I’ve seen people worried about.Big bombs, wmd's.
It would be "mobilization " first, forcing millions to join the armed forces, before risking more controversial options, I would think. Overwhelm them with ground forces.If ukraine starts taking land back, how long before putin uses bigger weapons? Surely he won't just lose, right?
Brief summary here; https://www.russiamatters.org/blog/...nst-new-old-foes-collaborators-and-corruptionIs there any analysis or news on local collaboration with the Russians in Kherson?
don't think russia is losing the war. might see ebbs and flows but ukraine isn't winning.If ukraine starts taking land back, how long before putin uses bigger weapons? Surely he won't just lose, right?
https://cis.mit.edu/publications/analysis-opinion/2022/ukraine’s-implausible-theories-victoryUkraine’s backers have proposed two pathways to victory. The first leads through Ukraine. With help from the West, the argument runs, Ukraine can defeat Russia on the battlefield, either depleting its forces through attrition or shrewdly outmaneuvering it. The second path runs through Moscow. With some combination of battlefield gains and economic pressure, the West can convince Russian President Vladimir Putin to end the war—or convince someone in his circle to forcibly replace him.
But both theories of victory rest on shaky foundations. In Ukraine, the Russian army is likely strong enough to defend most of its gains. In Russia, the economy is autonomous enough and Putin’s grip tight enough that the president cannot be coerced into giving up those gains, either. The most likely outcome of the current strategy, then, is not a Ukrainian triumph but a long, bloody, and ultimately indecisive war. A drawn-out conflict would be costly not only in terms of the loss of human life and economic damage but also in terms of escalation—including the potential use of nuclear weapons.
Ukraine’s leaders and its backers speak as if victory is just around the corner. But that view increasingly appears to be a fantasy. Ukraine and the West should therefore reconsider their ambitions and shift from a strategy of winning the war toward a more realistic approach: finding a diplomatic compromise that ends the fighting.
Victory on the battlefield?
Many in the West contend that the war can be won on the ground. In this scenario, Ukraine would destroy the Russian army’s combat power, causing Russian forces to retreat or collapse. Early on during the war, boosters of Ukraine argued that Russia could be defeated through attrition. Simple math seemed to tell the story of a Russian army on the verge of collapse. In April, the British defense ministry estimated that 15,000 Russian soldiers had died in Ukraine. Assuming that the number of wounded was three times as high, which was the average experience during World War II, that would imply that roughly 60,000 Russians had been knocked out of commission. Initial Western estimates put the size of the frontline Russian force in Ukraine at 120 battalion tactical groups, which would total at most 120,000 people. If these casualty estimates were correct, the strength of most Russian combat units would have fallen below 50 percent, a figure that experts suggest renders a combat unit at least temporarily ineffective.
These early estimates now look overly optimistic. If they were accurate, the Russian army ought to have collapsed by now. Instead, it has managed slow but steady gains in the Donbas. Although it is possible that the attrition theory could one day prove correct, that seems unlikely. The Russians appear to have suffered fewer losses than many thought or have nonetheless found a way to keep many of their units up to fighting strength. One way or another, they are finding reserves, despite their stated unwillingness to send recent conscripts or mobilized reservists to the front. And if push came to shove, they could abandon that reluctance.
If the collapse-through-attrition theory seems to have failed the test of battle already, there is another option: the Ukrainians could outmaneuver the Russians. Ukraine’s forces could beat the enemy in mechanized warfare, with tanks and accompanying infantry and artillery, just as Israel beat its Arab enemies in the 1967 Six-Day War and the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Neither Russia nor Ukraine has sufficient mechanized combat units to densely defend their vast fronts, which means in principle that either side should be vulnerable to rapid, hard-hitting mechanized attacks. So far, however, neither side appears to have resorted to such tactics. Russia may be finding that it cannot concentrate forces for such attacks without being observed by Western intelligence, and Ukraine may suffer from similar scrutiny by Russian intelligence. That said, a cagey defender such as Ukraine could lure its enemy into overextending itself. Russian forces could find their flanks and supply lines vulnerable to counterattacks—as appears to have occurred on a small scale around Kyiv in the early battles of the war.
But just as the Russian army is unlikely to collapse through attrition, it is also unlikely to lose by being outmaneuvered. The Russians now seem wise to the gambits Ukraine tried early on. And although details are scarce, Ukraine’s recent counterattacks in the Kherson region do not appear to involve much surprise or maneuver. Rather, they seem to look like the kind of slow, grinding offensives that the Russians have themselves mounted in the Donbas. It is unlikely that this pattern will change much. Although the Ukrainians, because they are defending their homeland, are more motivated than the Russians, there is no reason to believe that they are inherently superior at mechanized warfare. Excellence at that requires a great deal of planning and training. Yes, the Ukrainians have profited from Western advising, but the West itself may be out of practice with such operations, having not waged mechanized warfare since 2003, when the United States invaded Iraq. And since 2014, the Ukrainians have focused their efforts on preparing forces for the defense of fortified lines in the Donbas, not for mobile warfare.
More important, a country’s ability to conduct mechanized warfare correlates with its socioeconomic development. Both technical and managerial skills are needed to keep thousands of machines and electronic devices in working order and to coordinate far-flung, fast-moving combat units in real time. Ukraine and Russia have similarly skilled populations from which to draw their soldiers, so it is unlikely that the former enjoys an advantage in mechanized warfare.
A possible counterargument is that the West could supply Ukraine with such superior technology that it could best the Russians, helping Kyiv defeat its enemy through either attrition or mobile warfare. But this theory is also fanciful. Russia enjoys a three-to-one advantage in population and economic output, a gap that even the highest-tech tools would be hard-pressed to close. Advanced Western weapons, such as the Javelin and NLAW antitank guided missiles, have probably helped Ukraine exact a high price from the Russians. But so far, this technology has largely been used to leverage the tactical advantages that defenders already enjoy—cover, concealment, and the ability to channel enemy forces through natural and manmade obstacles. It is much harder to exploit advanced technology to go on the offense against an adversary that possesses a significant quantitative advantage, because doing so requires overcoming both superior numbers and the tactical advantages of defense. In the case of Ukraine, it is not obvious what special technology the West possesses that would so advantage the Ukrainian military that it could crack Russian defenses.
Interesting indeed given that Wlad was actually quite friendly with Putin at one point.Certainly an interesting career path he chose, was always one of my favorites.
Putin himself acted quite friendly to Europe/"the West" in earlier years...Interesting indeed given that Wlad was actually quite friendly with Putin at one point.
The way Russia had conducted this war is a rather old fashioned-obsolete way. First of all they haven't dominated the sky which has been a key feature in winning wars since at least Gulf War 1. That meant that their army and tanks were very vulnerable to anti tank missiles especially the queen of anti tank missiles aka the Javelin. After losing ridiculous amount of tanks and officers they switched on an over reliance on artillery that allowed the Russians to hit from a very long distance without being hit in response. We're talking the use of 20k artillery round per day here. Such tactic would never work against NATO who would claim air superiority and is not a very attractive way of conducted war as it cause huge devastation especially the old artillery systems being used by Russia.Since artillery has been one of Russias main advantages, I don't get why the west can't flood Ukraine with Artillery. I mean our stocks of them must be high.
I think they'd be better off systematically taking out Russian weapon storage depots with HIMARS to choke off their supplies.Since artillery has been one of Russias main advantages, I don't get why the west can't flood Ukraine with Artillery. I mean our stocks of them must be high.
You could go even further back a few decades to WWII, when aircraft carriers made the revered giant battleship more or less obsolete which even further reinforces your point.The way Russia had conducted this war is a rather old fashioned-obsolete way. First of all they haven't dominated the sky which has been a key feature in winning wars since at least Gulf War 1…
Well... technically HIMARS is an artillery system. So in a way you could say Ukraine is getting an artillery advantage, though not in numbers (which wouldn't be possible for the western countries to provide) but in quality.I think they'd be better off systematically taking out Russian weapon storage depots with HIMARS to choke off their supplies.
Well its not exactly WW1 trench/chemical weapons warfare. However it is an old fashioned type of war were the air is being mostly ignored. Another key issue is that Ukraine uses soviet-Russian weaponry that is usually not compatible to Western weaponry. That means that those helping Ukraine must foot the huge bill of buying them the system and the ammunition + they have to train them on how to use it as well.You could go even further back a few decades to WWII, when aircraft carriers made the revered giant battleship more or less obsolete which even further reinforces your point.
On a related note I’ve also heard some of this combat compared to being more akin to WWI than recent wars.
Same impression for me. Coordination of air superiority with quick advances at ground/sea level has been a feature of most wars since the introduction of blitzkrieg and then the Japanese expansion onto European/American colonies in Asia.You could go even further back a few decades to WWII, when aircraft carriers made the revered giant battleship more or less obsolete which even further reinforces your point.
On a related note I’ve also heard some of this combat compared to being more akin to WWI than recent wars.
The way Russia had conducted this war is a rather old fashioned-obsolete way. First of all they haven't dominated the sky which has been a key feature in winning wars since at least Gulf War 1. That meant that their army and tanks were very vulnerable to anti tank missiles especially the queen of anti tank missiles aka the Javelin. After losing ridiculous amount of tanks and officers they switched on an over reliance on artillery that allowed the Russians to hit from a very long distance without being hit in response. We're talking the use of 20k artillery round per day here. Such tactic would never work against NATO who would claim air superiority and is not a very attractive way of conducted war as it cause huge devastation especially the old artillery systems being used by Russia.
Russia had inherited a huge stock of such artillery rounds from the Soviet Union. Artillery rounds tend to be quite robust which means that they resisted the dubious storage methods used by a cash strapped Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. On top of that most European countries had slashed their military budget substantially in the past few years which means their stockpile is somehow low. Sure they had reversed the tendency but rounds tend to need time to be stockpiled especially at a time when the global supply line is being strained by Covid and war.
I.judt don't see how 16-20 himars can make that much of a difference in a war involving hundreds of thousands of soldiers.I think they'd be better off systematically taking out Russian weapon storage depots with HIMARS to choke off their supplies.
Those soldiers need feeding, fuel and ammo. There are not hundreds of thousands of supply depots or trucks available.I.judt don't see how 16-20 himars can make that much of a difference in a war involving hundreds of thousands of soldiers.
Disagree, you tend to need both.I think they'd be better off systematically taking out Russian weapon storage depots with HIMARS to choke off their supplies.
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Poland is investing heavily in ground forces. With the coming f35s the air force is also going to be capable, but still the western european countries have considersbly larger air forces, and of course navies. That state actually would be very beneficial for nato since air assets can be moved quickly , and there will be no need to deploy US troops early on in large numbers, because Poland would have the best equipped army in Europe.Germany, the German government and the German political parties should be embarassed, when looking at the contributions of Poland to the security of Europe, the EU and NATO.
With half the population and and a GDP per capita half of Germany they will have in the future roughly 4-5 times as much MBTs as Germany. They will also have much more IFV. That means they will field much more panzer and mechanized infantry divisions than any of its rich and more populous european western allies
Poland will be the backbone of land based European defense and security.
While Germany hast as much panzer divisions as Switzerland available...
Even without nukes its extremely difficult to achieve. It can get bombed into the ground though.Perhaps Russia needs invading?
They deserve some backlash at home but it will only work in favour mobilisation of the military.Perhaps Russia needs invading?
At least the Poles have the experience of having conquered Moscow before, thats always something.Even without nukes its extremely difficult to achieve. It can get bombed into the ground though.
Perhaps Russia needs invading?
I believe that just an ultimatum from NATO that Russia has 48 hours to remove all their forces from Ukraine (including Crimea) or these forces will be bombed without mercy inside Ukraine, would end this war today.Even without nukes its extremely difficult to achieve. It can get bombed into the ground though.
I've got into an accident 4 weeks ago which affected my schedule significantly. Don't really have the time to check this thread but if you have any questions feel free to tag me here.Is @harms still around ?
Hope its not too serious mate. Anyhow, since you are replying you are probably not in a gulag.I've got into an accident 4 weeks ago which affected my schedule significantly. Don't really have the time to check this thread but if you have any questions feel free to tag me here.
Sadly it was quite serious, but yeah, at least I'm not imprisoned.Hope its not too serious mate. Anyhow, since you are replying you are probably not in a gulag.