They took for granted that Kurds were a race and that Kurdistan was a place. In fact, it was already
depicted in pre-WWI atlases. The problem of drawing its borders fell, British Parliamentarians told themselves,
to them in immediate postwar years. And it’s what some powerful people in British officialdom
assumed would happen.
Not only did it fit British race thinking to create Kurdistan –
to be heavily staffed by British “advisers” like the other new states, of course – but they believed the Kurds truculent and independent, unlikely to accede to domination by a neighbor.
They would “never accept an Arab ruler,” in the
words of one British Colonial Office official, if they were embedded in an Arab nation.
A missed opportunity
But the Allies and the League of Nations never created Kurdistan. Why not?
British imperial self-interest in this case overruled ethnonational thinking. By the terms of
the Sykes-Picot agreement, the secret French and British understanding of roughly who would get what after the war, the French claimed dominance of the northern Levant, what’s today Lebanon and Syria.
The British wanted a big geographical bloc in the region to match that of the French, to act as a counterweight. They formalized this by inventing a large country soon dubbed “Iraq.”
The line dividing Sykes-Picot’s French sphere and British sphere
already cut straight through Kurdish areas. That partition was part of the reason why the British could not simply carve out a new, large Kurdistan (that they’d dominate like Iraq).