I started reading a book about the evolution of US nuclear strategy (The Bomb: Presidents, Generals, and the Secret History of Nuclear War), still in the earlier parts. But one thing so far that seemed a parallel to this situation is when the Nixon administration tried to play up the "madman theory", that Nixon might nuke North Vietnam in a fit of anger, to try and persuade the North Vietnamese to agree to a more favorable (for the US) peace agreement. The North Vietnamese were pretty unmoved by the threat. They then tried to sort of play the same card again on the Soviets, going as far as putting Strategic Air Command on one of their most active alerts in their history (more bombers in the air at all times) for about a week. The angle was also that they wanted the Soviets to pressure North Vietnam into a more favorable peace deal, and again that Nixon was so mad and angry that he might actually use the nukes. The Soviets also didn't seem to give a shit.
There's a parallel here where Ukraine is like North Vietnam, and the US and USSR/Russia are essentially inverted. Back in the late 60s/early 70s the thinking in the US was already that any sort of nuclear exchange was unlikely to be limited in any way, and would likely escalate rather quickly into an all-out exchange with casualties in the hundreds of millions for both sides, with neither of the countries ending up intact in any recognizable way (early US plans also roped China into the targets, whether they had initiated anything or not).
It's the only way to treat the nuclear threat really, given how utterly irrational it would be for any of the major countries to use one.