fergieisold
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Welcoming liberation I'd imagine.It's a good question and I wonder what these "ethnic Russians" in Ukraine think of the invasion.
Welcoming liberation I'd imagine.It's a good question and I wonder what these "ethnic Russians" in Ukraine think of the invasion.
Name them? What the hell.. how is the average Joe blogs gonna know the name? Seems to me to be an added step to put people off and reduce the numbersTweet
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It’s mostly correct. At first he doesn’t say about the nuclear missile and later he proposes that the strike can be made by a ballistic rocket even without a warhead, but the general idea is the same.Could somebody who speaks Russian confirm that this translation is correct?
It appears to be a Russian politician suggesting that Russia launches a nuclear strike in the Nevada desert to send a warning to the USA, but I'm not sure if the wording of the caption is accurate. Thanks in advance
@MoskvaRed @harms
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Yeah, it seems that they are leaving the actual organisation to everyone else rather than setting up any sort of system to help arrange these things.Name them? What the hell.. how is the average Joe blogs gonna know the name? Seems to me to be an added step to put people off and reduce the numbers
Some things to take into consideration. Turnout was lower in those eastern oblasts, suggesting a greater degree of apathy. Factors which may have helped convert this apathy to hostility to Ukrainian independence in recent years may include - a general disappointment of expectations; political dysfunction in eastern regions; fear of a total break with Russia represented by events of 2014; reaction to alleged measures taken against the Russian language after 2014.It's a good question and I wonder what these "ethnic Russians" in Ukraine think of the invasion.
It’s independence from the Soviet Union, not from Russia, people on the West (and now Putin) often confuse the two, but at that point that distinction was very important. And there was another referendum in the spring before (March of 1991) which led to drastically different results (70% of Ukrainians had voted to remain in USSR). It shows you how quickly those things can change even in the space of few months, don’t try to explain today’s events using the referendum from 3 decades ago that wasn’t even asking the same question.I note that Ukraine overwhelmingly (92.3%) voted for independence at the end of 1991. According to Wikipedia 55% of “ethnic Russians” (a category open to interpretation?) voted for independence. Every oblast with the exception of Crimea did so comfortably - well over 80% - including Donetsk and Luhansk. Crimea stands out as just 54% voted in favor there.
So two questions:
Are the results of this referendum considered reliable? I.E. was there manipulation or rigging?
Is there any reliable data to suggest that such sentiment has significantly changed in the last thirty years, especially with regards to Donetsk, Luhansk and Crimea? In other words, how can we accurately assess the actual popularity of the separatist agendas in these regions today?
This bunch of charlatans, they want to be seen to be doing the right thing but making it pretty bloody hard for those poor peopleYeah, it seems that they are leaving the actual organisation to everyone else rather than setting up any sort of system to help arrange these things.
I don't think that the East wanted to separate from Ukraine (the only part of Ukraine for which the question of the separation/reunification with Russia was always relevant was Crimea), but they were always pro-Russian — while the West was always more, well, Western-oriented with the main roots of Ukrainian nationalism (not in Putin's understanding) coming from there, with Lviv as its central hub of sorts. Kyiv was the most balanced city where both of those views were widely represented.Still we definitely need some actual hard data before just accepting claims that “the east wants to separate”. Certainly I don’t think we ought accept any pronouncements of this sort coming from Russian sources. The more I read about the events of 1991 the more apparent it becomes that Russian authorities back then had no respect for or understanding of the force of Ukrainian nationalism, and didn’t see that referendum result coming at all. And recent events (most obviously Putin’s own words) suggest they still don’t.
I posted about this 2 weeks ago. Most of the eastern regions used to vote for the pro Russian party.Is there any reliable data to suggest that such sentiment has significantly changed in the last thirty years, especially with regards to Donetsk, Luhansk and Crimea? In other words, how can we accurately assess the actual popularity of the separatist agendas in these regions today?
It makes sense if they are working on old assumptions.
A tv anchor I was listening to yesterday talked about old elections results. The “Party of regions”, the pro-Russian party that ruled Ukraine up to the 2014 revolution used to get good results in Kharkiv.
In the 2012 legislative elections this party polled 30 % nationwide, but in Kharkiv they had 50%+ in almost all districts. People over there might still have some positive sentiments toward the Russian people.
Isn't that just a missile away from something we'll be unable to deescalate in any possible way.The presidents of Poland, Czech Republic and Slovenia travelling to Kyiv today in a statement of unwavering EU support to Ukraine.
He never stated or indicitated they had such a right?It doesn’t matter if it wasn’t okay with Russia. They have no right to tell a sovereign state what alliances they can or can’t join.
It does seem very risky, but might also buy Kyiv some time. Strong show of support either wayIsn't that just a missile away from something we'll be unable to deescalate in any possible way.
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I understand that. At the same time, the referendum made reference to the Declaration of Independence issued in August which explicitly stated that “The territory of Ukraine is indivisible and inviolable.” Clearly there were some misgivings about this prospect in the eastern oblasts and especially Crimea, given the relatively lower turnout and percentages returned in favor compared with the rest of the country (though not enough to come anywhere near to actually swaying the result). So would it not be fair to explain the relatively greater hesitancy expressed in these regions as a consequence of greater pro-Russian sentiment (whatever that means)?It’s independence from the Soviet Union, not from Russia, people on the West (and now Putin) often confuse the two, but at that point that distinction was very important.
Case in point — Kharkiv, Mariupol’ and many other Eastern cities were generally pro-Russian before 2014. I don’t need to tell you that their stance had, well, changed since then to put in mildly.
I guess I’m looking for two things:I don't think that the East wanted to separate from Ukraine (the only part of Ukraine for which the question of the separation/reunification with Russia was always relevant was Crimea), but they were always pro-Russian — while the West was always more, well, Western-oriented with the main roots of Ukrainian nationalism (not in Putin's understanding) coming from there, with Lviv as its central hub of sorts. Kyiv was the most balanced city where both of those views were widely represented.
For example, this is the split from the 2004 election, the first one where the Ukrainians were essentially choosing between the West (Yushchenko was trying to move towards the EU and away from Russia) and Russia (Yanukovych was always extremely close with Kremlin):
This is from 2010, Tymoshenko was a prime minister under Yushchenko, Yanukovych is still closely connected to Moscow — as you can see, the results are almost the same (although Yanukovych wins this time):
Obviously I expect that all of those bright red regions had turned blue/deep blue by now.
That’s an interesting line of thought, and I can think of similar cases among minorities elsewhere who have found themselves somewhat ‘stranded’ in post-colonial nationalist states continuing to harbor positive sentiment for the old metropole.for some minorities It’s more about regionalism than “Euro scepticism” . The Greek community in Mariupol probably felt safer in a more diverse pro-Russian republic, than the alternative nationalist Ukraine.
His idea does ignore what Russia have said though.He never stated or indicitated they had such a right?
Some of you need to stop jumping down posters throats. His post is obvious and blatantly true, Sweden does not fall under the same political, cultural, or defensive threat to Russia.
I think the major inflection point in Ukraine was 2014. Before that, there was generally a lot of positive sentiment towards Russia (but not Putin) because of how Soviet era family/ethnic ties were interwoven across multiple SSRs. All of that took a massive hit with Putin's invasion of Crimea and Donbas and basically securitized the Ukrainians into viewing Russia as an existential threat. Putin, apparently stuck in the past, has since 2014 completely misjudged domestic Ukrainian sentiment as continuing to be what it was during the Yanukovich era, which is one of the primary reasons the invasion didn't go down as he thought it would. Even when you factor in Russian military incompetence of the past few weeks, they would've taken most of the red bits on the map if local Ukrainians were amenable. So in a sense, Putin's own post 2014 blunders created the conditions for his 2022 blunder.I don't think that the East wanted to separate from Ukraine (the only part of Ukraine for which the question of the separation/reunification with Russia was always relevant was Crimea), but they were always pro-Russian — while the West was always more, well, Western-oriented with the main roots of Ukrainian nationalism (not in Putin's understanding) coming from there, with Lviv as its central hub of sorts. Kyiv was the most balanced city where both of those views were widely represented.
For example, this is the split from the 2004 election, the first one where the Ukrainians were essentially choosing between the West (Yushchenko was trying to move towards the EU and away from Russia) and Russia (Yanukovych was always extremely close with Kremlin):
This is from 2010, Tymoshenko was a prime minister under Yushchenko, Yanukovych is still closely connected to Moscow — as you can see, the results are almost the same (although Yanukovych wins this time):
Obviously I expect that all of those bright red regions had turned blue/deep blue by now.
I always find the policies and public sentiment towards NATO, the EU etc. fascinating in Nordic countries. All of them are essentially half-in and half-out of various things. None are both fully signed up to the EU and NATO. Even Denmark’s relationship with the EU is made complicated by their opt outs. There’s seemingly a constant tension between a recognition and pragmatism to be part of the modern, interconnected world; but a stubbornness to actually fully commit.Sure, until you’re invaded.
Beyond that, Sweden has participated in 4 NATO led military campaigns and has an agreement in place to let NATO use bases in the country for training and for combat if Sweden were attacked, so…
This can't be right surely?!?The presidents of Poland, Czech Republic and Slovenia travelling to Kyiv today in a statement of unwavering EU support to Ukraine.
I spent a month in Georgia just before the 2008 war and got the sense of something similar - no love for Putin or Russian politics, but a lot of cultural and historic ties which run deep. Young people would still look/travel/migrate to Moscow for the big city experience to work/study/party in the same way lots of Irish still look to London.I think the major inflection point in Ukraine was 2014. Before that, there was generally a lot of positive sentiment towards Russia (but not Putin) because of how Soviet era family/ethnic ties were interwoven across multiple SSRs.
I'd imagine its similar across several former Soviet republics. In many ways, Ukraine's evolution as a post-Soviet nation is what Russia could've been with vaguely competent leadership during the same period.I spent a month in Georgia just before the 2008 war and got the sense of something similar - no love for Putin or Russian politics, but a lot of cultural and historic ties which run deep. Young people would still look/travel/migrate to Moscow for the big city experience to work/study/party in the same way lots of Irish still look to London.
You can’t find it because it largely didn’t exist. The DNR and LNR are almost entirely enabled, supported and funded by Russia. The war in Donbas is entirely of Russia’s making under the flag of sham states, with those fighting either being Russian forces, mercenaries or people otherwise forced into conscription.I guess I’m looking for two things:
1. Reliable data on the actual extent of explicitly separatist sentiment in the eastern regions throughout the last thirty years. Perhaps such data doesn’t exist, so we’re left with the maps above as our only vague guide to the question
My guess is that its probably on the high end of the spectrum and will wind up at about 20k over the coming weeks. Can't imagine this will sit well with the parents of thousands of Russian troops who thought their kids were on temporary "special military operations".Tweet
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I believe it's those counties PM's who are travelling, not Presidents.This can't be right surely?!?
Good that they repeatedly cite experts who they don't name and put menacing music in the background to make sure you know it's bad. Fills me with confidence that they have innocent motives for the video.
I doubt that reliable data exist but from my somewhat limited understanding I don’t think that separatist sentiments were wide-spread (aside from Crimea) — it was more of a case of having their own preference of their country’s vector of political & economic development that was very different from that of the Western Ukrainians.I guess I’m looking for two things:
1. Reliable data on the actual extent of explicitly separatist sentiment in the eastern regions throughout the last thirty years. Perhaps such data doesn’t exist, so we’re left with the maps above as our only vague guide to the question.
2. A greater interrogation of what exactly it means or has meant to be “pro-Russian” in this context. It seems to me that “pro-Russian” can potentially mean quite different things to different people at various times over the last thirty years.
As other posters have mentioned, the video is a bit shit, my main issue being their “I’m just asking questions approach” where they ask (twice in a slightly different wording) “can it be that Putin’s goal is actually trying to get rid of Azov?”… and they don’t answer that, instead not very subtly hinting on the answer to be yes.
I know very little about the region, but I was watching a youtuber called Bald and Bankrupt, who often visits Eastern Europe and the former USSR. He talks to people and a lot of people, especially older people talk about how life was better under the USSR. This is usually in places that used to be subsidised by the USSR and since it's collapse have fallen into decay and poor governance.It’s independence from the Soviet Union, not from Russia, people on the West (and now Putin) often confuse the two, but at that point that distinction was very important. And there was another referendum in the spring before (March of 1991) which led to drastically different results (70% of Ukrainians had voted to remain in USSR). It shows you how quickly those things can change even in the space of few months, don’t try to explain today’s events using the referendum from 3 decades ago that wasn’t even asking the same question.
Case in point — Kharkiv, Mariupol’ and many other Eastern cities were generally pro-Russian before 2014. I don’t need to tell you that their stance had, well, changed since then to put in mildly.
Massive.I believe it's those counties PM's who are travelling, not Presidents.
Still, it's a big statement.
Yeah, this is a very popular sentiment in the older generations in most of the ex-USSR republics (aside from the Baltics, I think).I know very little about the region, but I was watching a youtuber called Bald and Bankrupt, who often visits Eastern Europe and the former USSR. He talks to people and a lot of people, especially older people talk about how life was better under the USSR. This is usually in places that used to be subsidised by the USSR and since it's collapse have fallen into decay and poor governance.
Yes it’s confirmed. It has been over many reliable news outlets since the morning.Massive.
Are they going into Kyiv? Would have thought that would have been too perilous to get to.
“Together with the Prime Minister of Poland Mateusz Morawiecki, the Deputy Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński and the Prime Minister of Slovenia Janez Janša, we are going to Kiev today as representatives of the European Council to meet with President Zelenský and Prime Minister Shmyhal.”Tweet
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I've watched his videos too and there's an important distinction there. The people who were state employees and fully invested in the Communist Party had good lives, others are not so glowing in their reviews.I know very little about the region, but I was watching a youtuber called Bald and Bankrupt, who often visits Eastern Europe and the former USSR. He talks to people and a lot of people, especially older people talk about how life was better under the USSR. This is usually in places that used to be subsidised by the USSR and since it's collapse have fallen into decay and poor governance.
And still, the US basically fled from both. Russia sees this stuff and acknowledges to itself the human sacrifices it's willing to make while seeing the US/West unwilling to make those same sacrifices. It is part of the calculus that led Putin to think the rationale for war during this American administration was a sound one.Tweet
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Absolutely, I would assume. Killing political leaders of countries not at war should also immediately stop any support Russia is still getting globallyWould an attack on the train containing the European leaders traveling to Kyiv today trigger Article 5?