This is the first paragraph of the wiki page on ADUG.
So while we know who really owns City, the company they are part of officially claims to be private and separate from the Abu Dhabi government.
Newcastle similar thing.
They claim it is owned by a consortium of which the PIF are just the majority shareholder between that and as you point out the vague claim that they are not controlled by the Saudi Government. Both Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia to different degrees would like people to think that both clubs aren't state owned. So why are they hiding it?
Honestly, I dont know for sure but lets say they havent tried very hard to hide it in either case.
Sheikh Mansour is openly the owner of Man City and also the Deputy PM of Abu Dhabi. My guess in their case would be that it all relates to City's plans to get around FFP rules with inflated state sponsorship deals.
Meanwhile, Newcastle's ownership is even more clear since PIF is the Saudi public investment fund. The reason in Newcastle's case all related to their dispute with Qatar over PL TV rights which lead to the PL inititally trying to block the takeover before they realised they had no legal right to do so. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021_takeover_of_Newcastle_United_F.C.
If it’s not state backed then why is the bid so attractive? Does that not mean he has considerably less spending power that INEOS? I’m genuinely curious and I have tried to ask this before
"Sheikh Jassim Bin Hamad Al Thani has made a bid for Manchester United that he hopes will give him the keys to Old Trafford. But this is not the first time Sheikh Jassim has been involved in talks about a potential takeover.
In 2010, the Red Knights, a group of wealthy United fans, wanted to oust the Glazers from the club. So the group asked the Qatar royal family if they wanted to partner up. Talks were later held in Doha, and it can be revealed Sheikh Jassim was among those present..."
"Sheikh Jassim Bin Hamad Al Thani has made a bid for Manchester United that he hopes will give him the keys to Old Trafford. But this is not the first time Sheikh Jassim has been involved in talks about a potential takeover.
In 2010, the Red Knights, a group of wealthy United fans, wanted to oust the Glazers from the club. So the group asked the Qatar royal family if they wanted to partner up. Talks were later held in Doha, and it can be revealed Sheikh Jassim was among those present..."
That doesn't answer the question of why people are assuming he'll be able to invest large sums into facilities and transfers if, as reported, his personal wealth doesn't even cover the purchase price. Where's the money coming from?
That doesn't answer the question of why people are assuming he'll be able to invest large sums into facilities and transfers if, as reported, his personal wealth doesn't even cover the purchase price. Where's the money coming from?
It's pretty long, but I suppose these are the most relevant quotes in terms of this discussion:
"Qatar...is like “a corporation with the Sheikh as CEO” who initiates liberalization initiatives that aim to further centralize, rather than limit, his powers...
...Since ruling family members support each other through public funds and public policies that are usually geared toward their best interests and those of local merchants, the distinction between public and private funds is also problematic...[Despite] the existence of government institutions that “formally” appear to separate the rulers’ funds from those of the state, in practice, the lack of transparent budgets and financial reports, render these distinctions artificial."
"The development of Qatar from a small tribal sheikhdom to a modern state shares some similarities and differences with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The al-Thani family is considered the founder of Qatar. Sheikh Mohammed bin Thani expelled the Bahraini representative in 1866 and ruled over 18 tribes he united through marriages with their tribal heads, as well as strong neo-patrimonial and patronage systems that bought him their loyalty (al-Kuwari, 1978; Fromherz, 2012).The absence of an established hereditary arrangement made the members of Qatar’s ruling family the most imminent source of potential threat to its political legitimacy. Qatar’s first constitution of 1970, restricted the ruling of Qatar to the al-Thani family, but did not specify hereditary requirements. As a result, Qatar’s brief history has witnessed intense rivalry over political power among different members of the al-Thani family, evidenced by frequent coups between 1972 and 1996 (Kamrava,2013). This competition over power has considerably shaped the ties between the public and private sectors in Qatar.
The advent of abundant petroleum revenues in 1949 allowed Abdullah bin Qassim al-Thani to play a “patriarchal” role in Qatari society (al-Kuwari, 1978). In the absence of formal institutions, he “personally granted oil concessions, personally received the oil income, and personally decided the distribution of wealth” (Rathmell& Schulze, 2000:56). To legitimize and reinforce his political supremacy and prevent potential coups by his family members, he distributed cash handouts to all al-Thani members and also to other tribal leaders (al-Kuwari, 1978). Qatar’s independence from being a British protectorate in 1971 inaugurated the beginning of a centralized administrative development process.
The rapid inflow of petroleum revenues happened in parallel with an unprecedented influx of expatriates to Qatar, and an urgent need for public sector services (Bahry,2013). These changes saw the creation of a “personalized” bureaucratic machine that awarded vital government positions to the trusted members of the al-Thani, as well as other prominent families such as al-Attiyas (Fromherz, 2012; Khodr & Reiche, 2010).The intention behind this practice was to maintain regime stability through patron–client relationships that pay for the political loyalty of tribal leaders through influential and high paying public sector jobs. Qatar, therefore, is like “a corporation with the Sheikh as CEO” (Fromherz, 2012:127) who initiates liberalization initiatives that aim to further centralize, rather than limit, his powers (Kamrava, 2007)...
...In the absence of an independent merchant class in Qatar, the private sector is also predominantly run by the al-Thani and its closest merchant families. In contrast to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, the ruling family members in Qatar were “merchants first and rulers second” (Crystal, 1995). The advent of petroleum revenues and establishment of formal economic institutions witnessed the distribution of economic benefits to key members of the ruling family. Possessing the appropriate connections was particularly rewarding during oil booms, which were times that saw extensive government expenditures in infrastructure building. Because of its small geographical size, land is extremely expensive in Qatar, and having access to the al-Thani family, who own substantial tracts of land in business districts, is a condition to acquire land(Moore, 2002)...
...Since ruling family members support each other through public funds and public policies that are usually geared toward their best interests and those of local merchants, the distinction between public and private funds is also problematic (Mansour, 2007).Al-Kuwari (2012) argues that despite the existence of government institutions that “formally” appear to separate the rulers’ funds from those of the state, in practice, the lack of transparent budgets and financial reports, render these distinctions artificial. Even the appointment of the director of the Qatari Chamber of Commerce is deter-mined by the ruler who invariably appoints an al-Thani family member. Since the business community is not able to elect its own leader to voice concerns to policy makers, the Chamber of Commerce, in effect, acts more “as [a] government agency than an independent social association” (Moore, 2002:49)."
————————
More from another article here -
"In Abu Dhabi and Qatar...ruling family members are in control of powerful companies that dominate the economy – either personally or through sovereign wealth funds. The large-scale involvement of royals in the economy came about earlier in Qatar (in the late 1980s) than in Abu Dhabi (in the early 2000s), but has since increased in both emirates. The economic weight of former Qatari prime minister Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani and several sons of the late UAE president Sheikh Zayed, including Abu Dhabi’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed and UAE Deputy Prime Minister Mansour bin Zayed, illustrates this transition. Merchant elites are now subservient to the ruling families and are obliged to adapt to the latter’s business priorities...
... Business interests in Qatar and the UAE are to a large extent protected by the close interconnection of often indistinguishable economic and political elites..."
Honestly, I dont know for sure but lets say they havent tried very hard to hide it in either case.
Sheikh Mansour is openly the owner of Man City and also the Deputy PM of Abu Dhabi. My guess in their case would be that it all relates to City's plans to get around FFP rules with inflated state sponsorship deals.
Meanwhile, Newcastle's ownership is even more clear since PIF is the Saudi public investment fund. The reason in Newcastle's case all related to their dispute with Qatar over PL TV rights which lead to the PL inititally trying to block the takeover before they realised they had no legal right to do so. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021_takeover_of_Newcastle_United_F.C.
In both cases I'd agree mate they are probably at least partially reasons why they obfuscate their ownership but there are probably others reasons. Maybe to sidestep and distance the projects from criticism of human rights abuses, discrimination against LGBT. Both in the West and at home with regards to the clubs themselves being openly supportive of the LGBT community. Who knows really but both clubs have made an effort to at least present themselves as privatly owned.
It could also be the case with Qatar too, maybe to play it safe with UEFA dual club ownership. Another consideration is neither Abu Dhabi or Saudi Arabia already owned a top European club when they bought City and Newcastle, so maybe Qatar don't want to appear like they are abandoning PSG to sponsors investors etc. As there has been rumours doing the rounds for the best part of a year that they are looking to sell PSG.
In the case with Qatar it's all speculative of course but I just don't see how it wouldn't be a state backed bid on some level, especially with the numbers involved.
"Sheikh Jassim Bin Hamad Al Thani has made a bid for Manchester United that he hopes will give him the keys to Old Trafford. But this is not the first time Sheikh Jassim has been involved in talks about a potential takeover.
In 2010, the Red Knights, a group of wealthy United fans, wanted to oust the Glazers from the club. So the group asked the Qatar royal family if they wanted to partner up. Talks were later held in Doha, and it can be revealed Sheikh Jassim was among those present..."
I don't think that is Sheikh Jassim the son, that's HBJ the father who at the time I believe was head of the Qatari Investment Authority so it makes sense he was present in talks about a potential investment.
It's pretty long, but I suppose these are the most relevant quotes in terms of this discussion:
"Qatar...is like “a corporation with the Sheikh as CEO” who initiates liberalization initiatives that aim to further centralize, rather than limit, his powers...
...Since ruling family members support each other through public funds and public policies that are usually geared toward their best interests and those of local merchants, the distinction between public and private funds is also problematic...[Despite] the existence of government institutions that “formally” appear to separate the rulers’ funds from those of the state, in practice, the lack of transparent budgets and financial reports, render these distinctions artificial."
"The development of Qatar from a small tribal sheikhdom to a modern state shares some similarities and differences with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The al-Thani family is considered the founder of Qatar. Sheikh Mohammed bin Thani expelled the Bahraini representative in 1866 and ruled over 18 tribes he united through marriages with their tribal heads, as well as strong neo-patrimonial and patronage systems that bought him their loyalty (al-Kuwari, 1978; Fromherz, 2012).The absence of an established hereditary arrangement made the members of Qatar’s ruling family the most imminent source of potential threat to its political legitimacy. Qatar’s first constitution of 1970, restricted the ruling of Qatar to the al-Thani family, but did not specify hereditary requirements. As a result, Qatar’s brief history has witnessed intense rivalry over political power among different members of the al-Thani family, evidenced by frequent coups between 1972 and 1996 (Kamrava,2013). This competition over power has considerably shaped the ties between the public and private sectors in Qatar.
The advent of abundant petroleum revenues in 1949 allowed Abdullah bin Qassim al-Thani to play a “patriarchal” role in Qatari society (al-Kuwari, 1978). In the absence of formal institutions, he “personally granted oil concessions, personally received the oil income, and personally decided the distribution of wealth” (Rathmell& Schulze, 2000:56). To legitimize and reinforce his political supremacy and prevent potential coups by his family members, he distributed cash handouts to all al-Thani members and also to other tribal leaders (al-Kuwari, 1978). Qatar’s independence from being a British protectorate in 1971 inaugurated the beginning of a centralized administrative development process.
The rapid inflow of petroleum revenues happened in parallel with an unprecedented influx of expatriates to Qatar, and an urgent need for public sector services (Bahry,2013). These changes saw the creation of a “personalized” bureaucratic machine that awarded vital government positions to the trusted members of the al-Thani, as well as other prominent families such as al-Attiyas (Fromherz, 2012; Khodr & Reiche, 2010).The intention behind this practice was to maintain regime stability through patron–client relationships that pay for the political loyalty of tribal leaders through influential and high paying public sector jobs. Qatar, therefore, is like “a corporation with the Sheikh as CEO” (Fromherz, 2012:127) who initiates liberalization initiatives that aim to further centralize, rather than limit, his powers (Kamrava, 2007)...
...In the absence of an independent merchant class in Qatar, the private sector is also predominantly run by the al-Thani and its closest merchant families. In contrast to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, the ruling family members in Qatar were “merchants first and rulers second” (Crystal, 1995). The advent of petroleum revenues and establishment of formal economic institutions witnessed the distribution of economic benefits to key members of the ruling family. Possessing the appropriate connections was particularly rewarding during oil booms, which were times that saw extensive government expenditures in infrastructure building. Because of its small geographical size, land is extremely expensive in Qatar, and having access to the al-Thani family, who own substantial tracts of land in business districts, is a condition to acquire land(Moore, 2002)...
...Since ruling family members support each other through public funds and public policies that are usually geared toward their best interests and those of local merchants, the distinction between public and private funds is also problematic (Mansour, 2007).Al-Kuwari (2012) argues that despite the existence of government institutions that “formally” appear to separate the rulers’ funds from those of the state, in practice, the lack of transparent budgets and financial reports, render these distinctions artificial. Even the appointment of the director of the Qatari Chamber of Commerce is deter-mined by the ruler who invariably appoints an al-Thani family member. Since the business community is not able to elect its own leader to voice concerns to policy makers, the Chamber of Commerce, in effect, acts more “as [a] government agency than an independent social association” (Moore, 2002:49)."
————————
More from another article here -
"In Abu Dhabi and Qatar...ruling family members are in control of powerful companies that dominate the economy – either personally or through sovereign wealth funds. The large-scale involvement of royals in the economy came about earlier in Qatar (in the late 1980s) than in Abu Dhabi (in the early 2000s), but has since increased in both emirates. The economic weight of former Qatari prime minister Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani and several sons of the late UAE president Sheikh Zayed, including Abu Dhabi’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed and UAE Deputy Prime Minister Mansour bin Zayed, illustrates this transition. Merchant elites are now subservient to the ruling families and are obliged to adapt to the latter’s business priorities...
... Business interests in Qatar and the UAE are to a large extent protected by the close interconnection of often indistinguishable economic and political elites..."
It's a nice piece; sometimes people forget Al-Thani is a very large family. I hate wiki they cite the house of Thani in the 1990s as about 20,000. That context matters, and the reliance on very old sources without primary data collection.
I will seriously see it as the final straw for the sport for me. With the corruption/cheating scandals involving Juve/Barca/City and the way fifa was run, I already feel disenfranchised from the sport that has given so much enjoyment. Throw VAR into the mix, and some of the other forthcoming changes where gate receipts are prioritized over player well-being, and the last thing I needed was my own club, full of history and prestige, to be sold to a country with the issues that they have.
to me, it’s the same mentality as someone who won’t do their recycling correctly because they know so Many others aren’t. Tens of millions of people will now use the same excuse of “well, we can’t stop it so may aswell enjoy it as much as possible”. The reality is if more people stood up to it, it wouldn’t happen. Don’t forget the power fans have, they literally stopped a super league from happening. Countries like Qatar need to be held to account, and not allowed to continue on their path because they have unlimited money. If enough people wanted to effect change in that nation, I have no doubt that they could. $ talks, but most certainly not on my behalf so yes, as sad as it will be and as stubborn as I might be being, I’ll have nothing to do with the team should they be owned by Qatar.
Just hoping it's all concluded soon. This dragging out into later months threatens the plans for the new season. I actually think from a sporting perspective United would benefit from either Qatar (more) or INEOS. I question INEOS financial side of things being that they would need to raise the capital to acquire the club based on reports. Initially thought that SJR would be the equivalent of the Glazers from his first initial statement (which had nothing to do with football but the domestic sentimentality which is of no relevance on-field) but he redeemed himself with more revelation of details as time has progressed.
Glazers have shown next to no interest in the sporting aspects of the business. Woodward being in charge for so long, neglecting a modern hierarchical structure with a DOF until recent and many other strategic blunders it would be almost impossible for any new owner to have even more degraded directions.
Picked option 2. I'll still support the club while calling out our owners until something forces them out.
It's what United fans have done for years under the current owners, so it would continue. I'd probably not give a penny to the club either, which is a shame with 3 young kids already taking a keen interest.
A genuine question….this is not me being facetious or a cnut like I can be on here at times (or always).
There’s a feeling amongst many here that it is a Qatar state backed bid. I’m not getting into the argument of whether it is or not.
However, IF it is a state bid and Qatar are making a very concerted effort to disassociate themselves from the bid or any participation in the acquisition and have allowed it to be portrayed that it is a completely independent private investor.
If that’s the case, how would Qatar as a state be able to exercise any sportswashing if that’s their intention in acquiring Utd? It doesn’t make sense to disassociate yourself with the takeover and then try to carry out sportswashing on the back of it. You would surely want to be known to be behind the takeover.
Because it doesn’t need to be documented as a state bid in order for Qatar to reap the benefits. You have loads of Twitter accounts with Qatari flags. People in here downplaying human rights abuses, attacking those that highlight said human rights abuses as hypocrites or racists. That’s literally sports washing in action.
Because it doesn’t need to be documented as a state bid in order for Qatar to reap the benefits. You have loads of Twitter accounts with Qatari flags. People in here downplaying human rights abuses, attacking those that highlight said human rights abuses as hypocrites or racists. That’s literally sports washing in action.
In that case it doesn’t make sense to completely disassociate themselves with the takeover as they aren’t doing anything against the rules. It would actually be a more beneficial stance to take for sports washing purposes to be seen as a state bid.
In that case it doesn’t make sense to completely disassociate themselves with the takeover as they aren’t doing anything against the rules. It would actually be a more beneficial stance to take for sports washing purposes to be seen as a state bid.
In that case it doesn’t make sense to completely disassociate themselves with the takeover as they aren’t doing anything against the rules. It would actually be a more beneficial stance to take for sports washing purposes to be seen as a state bid.
Well no it wouldn’t, because they would have to demonstrate to UEFA that they (United and PSG) are run by two separate entities in order to have them both in the Champions League.
Not to mention that the only reason the Saudi takeover of Newcastle was approved, was because they managed to prove the disassociation between the state and the club…which was then subsequently disproven in court but after the take over.
I don’t want to be rude, but you don’t think that the people spending £5billion have thought about this in a bit more detail than you?
Edit. Seems like you answered your own question, so I’m not sure why you asked it.
Well, I suppose they might reason that owning (as in: everyone and his granny knows they do) two high-profile football clubs that both compete in the CL is best done in at least a somewhat subtle manner.
Let's say they set up an equivalent to the QSi (PSG's on-paper owner) in order to buy United - having two entities that are supposedly independent of each other (but again, everyone and his granny knows they're in reality the Qatari state) competing in the same top-tier tournament on a regular basis might be a bit too much: pesky journos might get even peskier, etc.
Well no it wouldn’t, because they would have to demonstrate to UEFA that they (United and PSG) are run by two separate entities in order to have them both in the Champions League.
Not to mention that the only reason the Saudi takeover of Newcastle was approved, was because they managed to prove the disassociation between the state and the club…which was then subsequently disproven in court but after the take over.
I don’t want to be rude, but you don’t think that the people spending £5billion have thought about this in a bit more detail than you?
Edit. Seems like you answered your own question, so I’m not sure why you asked it.
I’m not sure how that answers the question. There is no issue with Qatar owning both PSG and Utd (if that is what is happening here). It has already been reported that they just have to be shown to be managed by 2 seperate entities which is easy to do under two separate operating businesses . Both clubs being effectively owned by the same state doesn’t cause an issue. Hence the point still stands. If Qatar want to use Utd as a sportswashing exercise it makes more sense for them to openly associate themselves with the takeover rather than do it in secret.
"Sheikh Jassim Bin Hamad Al Thani has made a bid for Manchester United that he hopes will give him the keys to Old Trafford. But this is not the first time Sheikh Jassim has been involved in talks about a potential takeover.
In 2010, the Red Knights, a group of wealthy United fans, wanted to oust the Glazers from the club. So the group asked the Qatar royal family if they wanted to partner up. Talks were later held in Doha, and it can be revealed Sheikh Jassim was among those present..."
Correct me if I'm wrong, but it seems the reasons are he's a fan and has been interested in buying the club for a long time. Doesn't this apply to Radcliffe as well?
If the state is defined as the owner (one having a "decisive influence" or whatever the exact term in UEFA's rules is), then at least on paper it should be a major issue.
Unlike City's and Newcastle's owners, I don't think QSi actually pretends not to be (directly) linked to the state (I might be wrong, but the fact that QSi is a subsidiary of QIA isn't something they actually deny, is it?). So, again, setting up something similar to buy United might not be possible: if the de facto owner (the one with "decisive influence") is as easily identifiable as in PSG's case, you'd think that even UEFA would have to react.
Better/safer to set up something like this rather nebulous "92" thing.
I’m not sure how that answers the question. There is no issue with Qatar owning both PSG and Utd (if that is what is happening here). It has already been reported that they just have to be shown to be managed by 2 seperate entities which is easy to do under two separate operating businesses . Both clubs being effectively owned by the same state doesn’t cause an issue. Hence the point still stands. If Qatar want to use Utd as a sportswashing exercise it makes more sense for them to openly associate themselves with the takeover rather than do it in secret.
The whole point of being managed by two separate entities is that it creates legal separation between the state and the clubs (PSG and United for example). It’s a workaround for the UEFA rules that wouldn’t allow both clubs to play in the Champions League.
There’s simply no benefit for Qatar doing it the way you’re suggesting. Everyone already knows it’s their money, hence the flags on social media etc.
The whole point of being managed by two separate entities is that it creates legal separation between the state and the clubs (PSG and United for example). It’s a workaround for the UEFA rules that wouldn’t allow both clubs to play in the Champions League.
There’s simply no benefit for Qatar doing it the way you’re suggesting. Everyone already knows it’s their money, hence the flags on social media etc.
We’ll have to disagree. I would argue the opposite. If this is a sports washing exercise, it absolutely makes sense for Qatar to sing and dance about the fact they are backing the takeover. It can be legally constructed to satisfy all uefa laws. Qatar flags being posted on social media by Twitter users certainly isn’t the optimum way to sports wash.
We’ll have to disagree. I would argue the opposite. If this is a sports washing exercise, it absolutely makes sense for Qatar to sing and dance about the fact they are backing the takeover. It can be legally constructed to satisfy all uefa laws. Qatar flags being posted on social media by Twitter users certainly isn’t the optimum way to sports wash.
I suppose there could be one or two who actually, genuinely believe that Jassim is some kind of ultra rare, rogue agent with no ties to the Emir (United fan, private citizen, super rich, stacks of money hidden under his mattress that Deloitte knows nothin' about - all legit)...and perhaps one or two others who genuinely believe that the Qatari state is, basically, comprised of morons from the Emir down who don't know what the hell they're doing when it comes to this sportswashing lark.
I personally find it more likely that what we're seeing at the moment is mostly a load of United fans trying very hard to find something that can be used to justify welcoming the very thing they've been loathing and/or deriding for years.
I live in a country which in 2016 elected an authoritarian who eviscerated the rule of law and grinned with approval when his fawning supporters threatened his vice-president with execution -- and actually brought a noose with them in case they actually apprehended the vice-president to make good on their threat -- as they attempted a coup on their own regime, so as much as I would like to draw the line against abusers of human rights I'm not sure I can do that now, at least not in light of what my own country has allowed to happen in the last few years.
What I will say about mega-wealth owners in general is that the FA and perhaps the British government have to put into place controls to ensure that the kind of financial abuses City clearly committed over the last decade are not allowed to happen again. I understand that we're talking about two different things, but what we can't allow is sketchy ownership bringing in the kind of sketchy financial abuse that City brought to the PL.
I don't think that is Sheikh Jassim the son, that's HBJ the father who at the time I believe was head of the Qatari Investment Authority so it makes sense he was present in talks about a potential investment.
No it was the son, the article goes on to say he was only in his 20s at the time but was present as the meeting due his support for Man Utd
His father is on record saying he has no interest in sports investment and it's only his sons who are pushing for it
I live in a country which in 2016 elected an authoritarian who eviscerated the rule of law and grinned with approval when his fawning supporters threatened his vice-president with execution -- and actually brought a noose with them in case they actually apprehended the vice-president to make good on their threat -- as they attempted a coup on their own regime, so as much as I would like to draw the line against abusers of human rights I'm not sure I can do that now, at least not in light of what my own country has allowed to happen in the last few years.
What I will say about mega-wealth owners in general is that the FA and perhaps the British government have to put into place controls to ensure that the kind of financial abuses City clearly committed over the last decade are not allowed to happen again. I understand that we're talking about two different things, but what we can't allow is sketchy ownership bringing in the kind of sketchy financial abuse that City brought to the PL.
Correct me if I'm wrong, but it seems the reasons are he's a fan and has been interested in buying the club for a long time. Doesn't this apply to Radcliffe as well?
No it was the son, the article goes on to say he was only in his 20s at the time but was present as the meeting due his support for Man Utd
His father is on record saying he has no interest in sports investment and it's only his sons who are pushing for it
OK fair enough mate I couldn't access the article so I didn't see the bit about him being in his late 20's. Jassim and his father's names are very similar.
Preferred by who? The Glazers are obviously just going to take the highest offer and most sources think that will come from Sheikh Jassim but no one actually knows
I personally am awaiting further details about both bids (and apparently there might be others that haven't been made public), too many unknowns at the moment to be making decisions about which bid is better for the club
Preferred by who? The Glazers are obviously just going to take the highest offer and most sources think that will come from Sheikh Jassim but no one actually knows
I personally am awaiting further details about both bids (and apparently there might be others that haven't been made public), too many unknowns at the moment to be making decisions about which bid is better for the club
We can't call Manchester City all these years for their oil money funding and then welcome oil money funding with open arms.
It would be most fickle of us.
